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THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT
BREAKUP PROVISIONS: STABILITY OR HEADACHE?

Who's on first, What's on second, I Don't Know is on third.'
After almost eight decades of virtually no change to the Uniform
Partnership Act (UPA),2 the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (Conference) will consider a final and complete revision,
the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA), 3 in August of 1993. 4 The
Conference originally approved the UPA in 1914,s and eventually every
state in the nation except Louisiana adopted the UPA. 6 Because the UPA

1. Bud Abbott & Lou Costello, The Naughty Nineties (1945).
2. UNi. PATNERsmP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 5 (Master ed. 1969) [hereinafter UPA].
3. All references to specific Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) provisions are
taken from the 1992 Proposed Official Draft. However, the only available official comments
to the RUPA are taken from a 1991 draft. Presently, the Drafting Committee to Revise the
Uniform Partnership Act (Drafting Committee) is working on the final Official Comment to
the RUPA.
4. Telephone Interview with Professor John W. Larson, Assoc. Prof. of Law, Florida
State University (Apr. 22, 1993). Professor Larson is the Assistant Reporter for the RUPA
and has been closely affiliated with the writing of the RUPA. The Drafting Committee
continues to amend and revise the RUPA and has been working closely with a small working
committee of the American, Bar Association (ABA). Id. Final action may take place in
December of 1993, when the Conference will submit the RUPA to the ABA's Partnership
Committee for final comments. Id. The Conference does not have to adopt any amendments
suggested by the ABA. Id. The Conference's official meeting with the Partnership Committee
of the American Bar Association will occur on April 16, 1993. Id. The Conference does not
have to adopt any amendments suggested by the Partnership Committee of the ABA. Id.
5. HAROLD G. RauscmIIN & WnmIm A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERsmp § 174, at 249 (2d ed. 1990). Prior to the formation of the UPA, case law governed
partnerships in the United States. Id. at 248. For that reason, the law in many jurisdictions
differed regarding various issues. Id. Because of uncertahlrty and confusion in case law, demand
grew for statutory development and uniformity. ALAN R. BROMERO, CRANE & BROMBERG ON
PARTNERSHip § 2, at 12-13 (1968). The response was the Conference's development of the
UPA, one stated purpose of which was to standardize state partnership law. UPA § 4(4), 6
U.L.A. at 16. The original drafters of the UPA saw a distinct need for uniformity in partnership
law because of the confusion between theory and practice. See UPA Commissioner's Prefatory
Note, 6 U.L.A. at 7 (describing some early problems associated with desirability of forming
uniform national law on partnerships). In addition, the drafters noted the lack of authority
regarding important matters of business law related to partnerships and the uncertainty that
this lack of authority generated. Id. All of these early catalysts for statutory revision-inequity,
lack of uniformity, need for standardization and source of authority-show that confusion in
the law of partnership may often drive further revision.
6. See UPA, 6 U.L.A. at I (Supp. 1992) (listing statistics in tabular form of when
various states adopted UPA); RnusciiIN & GREGORY, supra note 5, § 174, at 249 (noting
general adoption of UPA in United States, as well as Guam and Virgin Islands).
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has had such an immense impact on partnership law,7 a complete revision
may have a similar effect for years to come.8
The Drafting Committee, appointed by the Conference, has completely
revised the UPA sections covering partnership breakups. 9 The RUPA provisions relating to partnership breakups govern the rights of the partners
during and after a breakup.' 0 The breakup provisions are especially important to those partnerships lacking a partnership agreement because the
Drafting Committee intends most of the RUPA provisions to act as default
rules, provisions that take effect in the absence of a contrary agreement."
Accordingly, the RUPA will have the greatest effect upon those businesses

7. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (giving reference to statistical support and
discussing virtually unanimous enactment of UPA in United States).
8. See ALAN R. BROMBERO & LARRY E. RmsTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 1.01(b), at 1:2 to :6 (1988) (outlining general position and importance of partnership
relative to corporate and proprietorship forms); id. at 1:6 to :10 (listing helpful statistics for
comparative analysis of partnerships to other major business forms); The UPA Revision
Subcommittee of the Committee on Partnerships and Unincorporated Business Organizations,
Should the Uniform PartnershipAct Be Revised?, 43 Bus. LAW. 121, 121-22 (1987) [hereinafter
UPA Revision Subcommittee, Revision?] (noting importance of partnership form of business
and giving helpful partnership revenue statistics in United States).
9. Donald J. Weidner, Three Policy DecisionsAnimate Revision of Uniform Partnership
Act, 46 Bus. LAw. 427, 431 (1991).
This Note will use "breakup" to denote a generic situation in which partners either have
acted in a manner to dissolve a partnership or have dissociated themselves from the partnership.
Furthermore, this Note will attempt to use the more precise terms-dissociation, dissolution,
winding up, termination, and liquidation-when they specifically apply and according to the
particular, statutory discussion.
10. See Larry E. Ribstein, A Mid-Term Assessment of the Project to Revise the Uniform
Partnership Act, 46 Bus. LAW. 111, 142 (1990) (noting great need of revision to existing
provisions involving partner dissociation and discussing dependence of RUPA success on any
revisions to breakup provisions of UPA).
11. See Weidner, supra note 9, at 453 (defining "default" and "mandatory" rule); id.
at 454-56 (describing how Drafting Committee minimized RUPA's mandatory rules).
Some information on default and mandatory rule systems may aid the reading of the
subsequent analysis. If the partners do not create a partnership agreement, the UPA currently
acts as a backup system of default rules governing each party's rights and the obligations of
each partner. See Donald J. Weidner, The Revised Uniform PartnershipAct Midstream:Major
Policy Decisions, 21 U. TOL. L. REV. 825, 827-29 (1990) (describing definition and effect of
UPA and RUPA as default or backup systems of rules). On the other hand, a mandatory
rule applies regardless of an agreement to the contrary. Id. at '827. Whether certain UPA
provisions are mandatory or default rules is sometimes unclear. Id. However, section 103 of
the RUPA expressly notes those provisions that are mandatory and somewhat variable. See
REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 103 (Proposed Official Draft 1992) (listing all RUPA
provisions not subject to contrary agreement and rules that partnership agreement may not
"unreasonably" vary). The remaining provisions of the RUPA will serve as default rules. See
id. § 103(a) (stating general rule that partnership agreement will govern relations among
partners, and between partners and partnership and that RUPA will govern other aspects of
relationship not covered in partnership agreement). Important to subsequent analysis, default
rules sometimes have had unforeseen and unintended effects, especially after a partnership
breakup. See infra notes 31-39 and accompanying text (discussing Fairway Dev. Co. v. Title
Ins. Co., 621 F. Supp 120 (N.D. Ohio 1985)).

19931

REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT

lacking a written agreement-mainly small partnerships.' 2 Therefore, the
the attorneys who serve it should carefully
small business community and
3
scrutinize the proposed act.'
The RUPA should reflect the particular needs and interests of the small
business community because of the potentially adverse effects the new
default rules may have on that community.' 4 Further, the RUPA should
clearly define and use any new terminology in order to avoid confusion.' 5
The primary theses of this Note are: (1) some sections of the RUPA breakup
provisions do not reflect the particular needs of the closely held partnership;
and (2) the RUPA breakup provisions will cause confusion in partnership
law because they use key UPA terminology in an entirely different fashion
and add new terminology that has the same function as previous UPA
terms. In reviewing the breakup provisions of the RUPA, critical analysis
will therefore focus on the needs of the small business community and
whether the RUPA clearly defines and uses new terminology. However,
because of extensive revisions to the UPA and the increased size of the
RUPA,1 6 this review and analysis will focus on the effect of the new breakup
provisions to closely held partnerships in only four contexts: (1) old and
new terminology; (2) causes of dissolution (UPA) and dissociation (RUPA);
(3) authority and control of the withdrawing partner; and (4) continuing
liability of the withdrawing partner.

I.

AGGREGATE VS. ENTITY THEORY OF PARTNERSHIP

A brief discussion of the conceptual theories that drive and support the

12. See Stoutt v. Ridgway, 658 S.W.2d 420, 421 (Ark. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that
because partnership agreement did not provide for dissolution and termination of partnership,
UPA provisions applied); Larry E. Ribstein, A Statutory Approach to PartnerDissociation,
65 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 364 (1987) (stating that due to high transaction costs large partnerships
are more likely to enter into elaborate partnership agreements and, thus, closely held or small
partnerships are proper model for statutory law governing partnership breakups).
Notably, § 802 of the RUPA, which enforces a ninety day delay for dissolution of an
at-will partnership, is literally the only section in the entire RUPA that is not retroactive. See
REvisED UNIF. PARTNERsmP ACT § 1006(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1992) (excluding § 802
from affecting existing partnerships). Because § 802 is the only nonretroactive provision, it is
also the only "opt in" provision of the RUPA for existing partnerships. Id. See infra notes
267-86 and accompanying text (analyzing § 802 and its effect upon small partnership dissolution
under RUPA).
13. See infra note 261 (noting importance of small partnership in formation of RUPA
and general consensus that RUPA is for small partnerships).
14. See infra notes 267-86 and accompanying text (discussing importance of RUPA
default provisions to small partnership and withdrawing partner in hypothetical situation).
15. See Weidner, supra note 9, at 435-38 (discussing confusion caused by UPA terminology); Weidner, supra note 11, at 847 (giving assurances of clarity to small business
community).
16. See Weidner, supra note 9, at 453 (stating that RUPA is larger than UPA, although
increased size supposedly adds specificity and clarity).
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rules governing partnerships will clarify later analysis. Even before the
original formation of the UPA, 17 two major theories vied for recognition
as the conceptual framework that most accurately or properly reflects the

way partnerships do business." The aggregate theory treats the partnership
as a conglomerate of unique individuals and a "vehicle" through which the
partners conduct business.'

9

Moreover, the aggregate theory views each

partner as having an undivided, pro rata share of partnership assets. 20 The
entity theory treats the partnership as a separate legal entity, completely
distinct from the individual partners. 2' Similar to the treatment of a corporate shareholder, under the entity theory each partner has separate legal
rights, and ownership of partnership assets is in the partnership entity.'2

However, unlike a corporate shareholder, each partner has unlimited liability
23
for partnership debts.

Commentators and courts have been divided in their approach to and

opinion of the UPA and its reflection of either theory of partnership.2
Although supposedly an aggregate approach to partnership law,25 the UPA

also contains provisions that demonstrate a reliance on the entity theory of
partnership. 26 However, the original drafters of the UPA may have based
17. See generally William D. Lewis, The Uniform PartnershipAct, 24 YALE L.J. 617
(1915) (giving helpful background information and insight into debate involving aggregate and
entity theories of partnership).
18. See RauscmmiN & GREGORY, supra note 5, § 174, at 249 n.7 (listing articles comprising
early debate surrounding formation of UPA, most of which discuss two major theories of
partnership).
19. See Weidner, supra note 9, at 428 (explaining general characteristics of aggregate
theory of partnership).
20. Id.
21. See id. (discussing general characteristics of entity theory of partnership).
22. Id.
23. See UPA § 15, 6 U.L.A. at 174 (stating joint and several liability for each partner);
REuscHLEiN

& GREGORY, supra note 5, § 182, at 265 (noting difficulty of viewing partnership

as separate entity because each partner has unlimited personal liability for all partnership
debt).
24. See Helvering v. Smith, 90 F.2d 590, 591-92 (2d Cir. 1937) (providing amusing
example of how Judge Learned Hand took his usual subtle approach in stating that it would
be "palpable perversion" to consider UPA as creating new and separate legal entity for
partnership form of business); BROMBERG, supra note 5, § 3(b), at 18 (noting considerable
disagreement in courts and commentators over UPA's use of either aggregate or entity theories).
See generally Gary S. Rosin, The Entity-Aggregate Dispute: Conceptualism and Functionalism
in PartnershipLaw, 42 ARK. L. Rav. 395 (1989) (discussing both theories of partnership and
criticizing strict emphasis of either as conceptual framework for construction of partnership
law).
25. See ReuscmI n & GREGORY, supra note 5, § 174, at 249 (stating that Conference
decided to stress aggregate theory of partnership); id. § 182, at 264 (asserting that drafters
used aggregate approach in final draft of UPA).
26. See A. Ladru Jensen, Is a Partnership Under the Uniform Partnership Act an
Aggregate or an Entity?, 16 VAND. L. REv. 377, 379 (1963) (stating that UPA contains
provisions reflecting both aggregate and entity theories of partnership). However, it is this
author's view that the UPA wisely takes a straightforward and practical approach to partnership
affairs and, in this way, reflects characteristics of both conceptual theories of partnership.
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the breakup provisions27 on an extreme aggregate theory of partnership,
because under the UPA a partnership dissolves immediately upon almost
any substantive change in relation among the original partners. 28 Dean
Donald J. Weidner, Reporter for the RUPA, and other academicians view
the UPA breakup provisions as' an example of reliance on the .aggregate
theory of partnership. 29
A strict conceptual approach, using either the aggregate or entity theory,
may have a fundamental effect on case law and unintended consequences
for businesses. 0 For example, in FairwayDevelopment Co. v. Title Insurance
Co.,' a real estate partnership purchased a title insurance policy before two
32
of the original partnership members sold their interests in the business.
The resulting partnership, consisting of one original partner and one new
member, filed suit against the title insurance company for damages sustained
due to an undiscovered easement on the relevant property. 3 The district
court reasoned that because Ohio views a partnership as a distinct group
of individuals, any change of membership extinguishes the original partner-

27. See generally UPA §§ 29-43, 6 U.L.A. at 365-544 (providing breakup provisions of
UPA).
28. BROMBERG & RmsTmN, supra note 8, § 7.01(a), at 7:3 to :4; Weidner, supra note 9,
at 436-38; see infra notes 87-96 and accompanying text (noting major causes of partnership
dissolution and offering case examples).
29. Weidner, supra note 9, at 436-38; see BROMBERG & RmsTIN, supra note 8, § 7.01(a),
at 7:3 to :4 (pointing out UPA's apparent reflection of aggregate theory of partnership).
30. See BROMBERG & RmsTEiN, supra note 8, § 7.01(a), at 7:3 to :4 (relating that easy
dissolvability of partnership reflects extreme aggregate theory of partnership in UPA); RauscHLEiN & GREGORY, supra note 5, § 182, at 264 (noting importance of viewing partnership as
either aggregate or entity and legal consequences of choosing either theory); Weidner, supra
note 9, at 437-38 (stating that fundamental problem of UPA is emphasis of aggregate theory
of partnership, resulting in instability of partnership); infra notes 77-86 and accompanying
text (discussing Fidelity Trust Co. v. BVD Assocs., 492 A.2d 180 (Conn. 1985), which involves
effect of partnership dissolution on loan acceleration clause and conceptual result of viewing
partnership as separate legal entity).
United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121 (1958), is another interesting example
of how a conceptual viewpoint of the partnership form of business may affect the outcome
of litigation. The United States Supreme Court considered whether the federal government can
hold a partnership liable for violation of criminal laws that require proof of intentional
conduct. rd. at 121-22. The Supreme Court likened the partnership form of business to that
of a corporation and reasoned that the two were both entities for purposes of the federal
statute. Id. at 124-26. The Supreme Court noted that even though the common law did not
treat a partnership as a separate legal entity from the partners, Congress was free to change
the definition of a partnership and conceive of a partnership as a separate and distinct entity.
Id. at 124-25. The Supreme Court held that partnership entities may knowingly violate criminal
statutes, and therefore, the partnerships in A & P Trucking were subject to criminal liability.
Id. at 126-27. Arguably, if the Supreme Court had not treated the partnership as an entity,
the government would have been limited to prosecuting the individual partners. Id. at 127.
31. 621 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
32. Fairway Dev. Co. v. Title Ins. Co., 621 F. Supp 120, 121 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
33. Id. at 120-21.
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ship.3 4 The district court explained that after the original partners sold their
interests in the business, the original partnership dissolved and a "new"
partnership began.35 The district court found that the plaintiff, the new
partnership, was not the original party to the insurance policy 6 For this
reason the district court held that the subsequent partnership had no standing
to bring suit and ordered summary judgement for the defendant insurance
company. 37 The court did not find persuasive the plaintiff's argument that
all parties to the transfer intended for the partnership to continue without
dissolution. 3 Arguably, if the court had viewed the partnership as an entity,
the insurance policy would have transferred and protected the plaintiff
39
partnership.
Dean Weidner and the other drafters have emphasized the entity theory
of partnership in the RUPA. 4° While some vestiges of the aggregate approach
will remain in the RUPA, 41 the RUPA will stress an entity approach to
partnership law. 42 Indeed, the RUPA, unlike the UPA, actually defines a
partnership as an entity. 43 One reason for emphasis of the entity theory
34. Id. at 124.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 125.
38. Id. at 121-22, 124-25.
39. See Weidner, supra note 9, at 437-38 (using Fairway Development as example in
demonstrating that because UPA relies on aggregate theory of partnership, UPA destabilizes
partnerships that have contracted for stability).
40. See REviSED UIT. PARTm'smHp ACT § 201 (Proposed Official Draft 1992) (stating
definition of partnership as entity); REviSED UNtm. PARTrEmsmp ACT § 201 cmt. (Proposed
Official Draft 1991) (stating that net effect of RUPA is to move towards entity theory of
partnership); Weidner, supra note 9, at 428-30 (stating that RUPA will shift towards entity
approach because of ABA recommendations, simplicity, and concordance with business expectations).
41. Weidner, supra note 9, at 433. Dean Weidner stated the following in regards to the
RUPA's handling of the fiduciary duty of partners:
The text of RUPA anticipates that an aggregate approach will continue to be applied
in certain situations ....
With respect to both large and small partnerships, however,
an aggregate approach is particularly useful to state the traditional fiduciary duties
among partners. Therefore, despite RUPA's major move toward the entity theory,
RUPA section 21(a) [now § 404(e)] states that a partner has a duty of good faith
and fair dealing "towards the partnership and the otherpartners." Similarly, RUPA
section 21(b) [now § 404(b)] states that a partner has a duty of loyalty "to the
partnership and the other partners." Not only must partners be concerned about
the effect of their conduct on the partnership as an entity, but also they must avoid
oppressive behavior toward individual partners.
Id. (clarification added).
42. See id. at 428-32 (explaining general debate over entity versus aggregate theory and
discussing how RUPA moves closer to entity theory in breakup provisions). See generally
Committee on Uniform State Laws, The Entity Theory of Partnership and the Proposed
Revisions to the Uniform PartnershipAct, THE REc. OF THE Ass'N OF TH B. OF THE CrrY OF
NEw YoRK 563 (1991) [hereinafter Committee on Uniform State Laws, Entity Theory of
Partnership] (discussing RUPA's express definition of partnership as entity and how RUPA
moves closer to entity theory of partnership in various sections).
43. REvisE UNIF. PARTNERSmp ACT § 201 (Proposed Official Draft 1992). Section 201
of the RUPA states in full: "A partnership is an entity." Id.
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may be that the courts favor the entity theory because it is more "realistic"
and in accord with usual business practices. 4
Not all scholars agree with a strict conceptual approach to the structuring
of rules governing partnerships, 45 and some practitioners do not agree with
strictly and expressly defining a partnership as an entity. 46 Some scholars
and practitioners favor a practical or functional approach to addressing
partnership problems. 47 A functional approach recognizes the underlying
business interests or "realities" of the involved parties and appropriately
adopts either of the two theories of partnership. 4 Indeed, the UPA already
may reflect such a functional approach to partnership law. 49 A flexible
approach not tied to a dogmatic conception of business partnership, either
aggregate or entity theory, may better reflect the real interests of business
partners.5 0 Furthermore, a functional approach to solving partnership problems might ask what the business expectations are according to each partic5
ular type of partnership-small, large, contractual, or inadvertent. '
II. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT BREAKUP PROVISIONS
Before critically analyzing the new RUPA provisions governing partnership breakups, a brief review of the existing UPA breakup provisions
will also aid subsequent analysis.
A. UPA Dissolution
The UPA changed the legal terminology used to describe partnership
breakups. 5 2 Furthermore, the UPA employs terminology and definitions not

-

44. See REuscmLEwn & GREGORY, supra note 5, § 182, at 264 (stating opinion that entity
theory of partnership continues to keep its attractiveness to courts because theory is seen as
realistic and supposedly reflects business expectations).
45. See REUsClLEIn & GREGORY, supra note 5, § 182, at 264 (supporting pragmatic
approach to solving partnership problems); Ribstein, supra note 10, at 115-16 (criticizing strict
conceptual approach of either aggregate or entity theory of partnership and suggesting contextual definition of partnership in order for legal consequences to control characterization
and not other way around). See generally Rosin, supra note 24 (discussing merits of both
theories of partnership, criticizing entity theory of partnership, and recommending functional
approach to partnership problems).
46. See Committee on Uniform State Laws, Entity Theory of Partnership, supra note
42, at 570-71 (discussing flexible approach to solving dilemma of defining partnership as either
aggregate or entity and recommending use of judicial standards and consideration of various
interests of different parties in resolving partnership problems).
47. Id.; see Rosin, supra note 24, at 400-01 (stating central thesis of using functional
approach in revising UPA).
48. See Rosin, supra note 24, at 436-59 (describing potential implementation of functional
approach to partnership law and flexibility of such system).
49. See id. at 415-36 (suggesting that UPA already has characteristics of functional
approach); id. at 421-22 (discussing UPA's functional approach to handling transfer of
partnership property upon dissolution and UPA's recognition of real interests of creditors of
partnership upon dissolution).
50. See infra notes 281-91 and accompanying text (analyzing potential need of flexibility
for small business partner in context of hypothetical case study).
51. See infra note 291 and accompanying text (demonstrating in context of hypothetical
breakup what might be business expectations of partners in closely held partnership).
52. See REuscm=iN & GREGORY, supra note 5, § 227, at 343 (noting UPA's moderate
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in accord with common usage today." The three key terms used in the
breakup provisions of the UPA are "dissolution," "winding up," and
"termination. '54 Within the meaning of the UPA, dissolution refers to the
point in time when some fundamental change in relation occurs between
the original partners. 5 Thus, dissolution, literally defined as a change in
relation between the partners,5 6 acts as the trigger to the UPA breakup
provisions. 7 Winding up refers to the process by which members of the

original partnership complete the affairs of the old partnership.5 s Termination refers to the completion of all previous business affairs of the
original partnership and designates the end of the partnership. 9 Importantly,

a partnership does not terminate upon dissolution, but continues until all
the affairs of the old partnership are wound upA0
Although the original drafters used relatively precise language to define

the key terms, both attorneys and courts have indiscriminately used and
confused dissolution, winding up, and termination. 61 One fundamental problem has been judicial misunderstanding of the unique meaning of the UPA
"dissolution."

62

The unique definition of the UPA "dissolution" embodies

change to partnership law at time of its original creation, but adding that UPA did change
legal terminology of partnership law).
53. See id. (stating that UPA uses definitions in different manner than common usage).
54. See UPA §§ 29-30, 6 U.L.A. at 364-76 (giving definitions of major terms and offering
helpful case examples using all terms). The Official Comment of the UPA states, "In this act
dissolution designates the point in time when the partners cease to carry on the business
together; termination is the point in time when all the partnership affairs are wound up;
winding up, the process of settling partnership affairs after dissolution." Id. § 29.
55. See id. (defining dissolution); REuscsImEnw & GREGORY, supra note 5, § 227, at 34347 (explaining definition of dissolution and giving helpful case examples and hypothetical
situations).
56. See infra text accompanying note 64 (stating complete UPA § 29 definitionr of
dissolution).
57. See Weidner, supra note 9, at 435 (stating that dissolution activates all UPA provisions
governing partnership breakups).
58. See Simmons v. Quick-Stop Food Mart, Inc., 296 S.E.2d 275, 280 (N.C. 1982)
(noting that winding up of partnership affairs generally involves paying creditors of partnership
and settling of accounts between partners); REUSCu-IN & GREGORY, supra note 5, § 227, at
343 n.4 (stating that although original drafters did not specifically define "winding up" in
text of UPA, §§ 29-30 and 33-35 all give meaning to term); supra note 54 (quoting Official
Comment's explanation of all three key terms within UPA).
59. See UPA § 30, 6 U.L.A. at 367 (stating that termination occurs at end of winding
up process); REuSCHEIN & GREGORY, supra note 5, § 227, at 343-47 (explaining definition of
termination and giving helpful case examples and hypothetical situations).
60. See Steeby v. Fial, 765 P.2d 1081, 1083 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (noting that partnership
does not terminate upon dissolution but only when partnership affairs are completed); Bass
v. Dalton, 355 N.W.2d 225, 227 (Neb. 1984) (stating that dissolution is only preparatory step
to termination aad that partnership business continues until winding up is completed); UPA
§ 30, 6 U.L.A. at 367 (stating negative definition of § 30); RuscMEIN & GREGORY, supra
note 5, § 227, at 343-47 (explaining usage of § 30 of UPA).
61. BROMBERG, supra note 5, § 73, at 416.
62. See Weidner, supra note 9, at 436 n.25 (citing three cases in which court restricts
dissolution as to some partners and not to others, in clear contravention of UPA provisions
regarding dissolution).
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dual concepts of cause and effect.63 Section 29 of the UPA defines dissolution as "the change in the relation of the partners caused by any partner

ceasing to be associated in the carrying on as distinguished from the winding
up of the business."' ' Some commentators believe that section 29 confuses
the cause and effect of dissolution. 61 Section 29 of the UPA may not only
generate confusion regarding the cause and effect of dissolution, but it may
66
also correspond imperfectly to the other breakup provisions of the UPA.
For example, some partnership dissolutions do not involve partner dissociations or withdrawals. 7 Likewise, under various statutory provisions and
case law, some dissociations or withdrawals of partners do not necessarily
cause a dissolution of the partnership. 68
It is important to distinguish dissolution from winding up under the
UPA. 69 Dissolution of a partnership does not automatically signify a discontinuance of the partnership business. 70 In reality, most partnerships
continue after a dissolution. 7' Only at the end of the winding up process,

63. See RisTEN & BROMBERG, supra note 8, § 7.01(a), at 7:2 (noting confusion
engendered by dual embodiment of cause and effect within § 29 of UPA).
64. UPA § 29, 6 U.L.A. at 364.
65. See BROMBERG, supra note 5, § 73, at 416-17 (stating that courts and attorneys use
terms indiscriminately and that UPA is imprecise in internal coordination between sections
and that § 29 definition confuses cause and effect); RirsTmiN & BROMBERO, supra note 8, §
7.01(a), at 7:2 (discussing confusion caused by dissolution).
66. See BROMBERG, supra note 5, § 73, at 416 (discussing how sections of UPA do not
precisely work together); RmsTEiN & BROMBERO, supra note 8, § 7.01(a), at 7:2 (same).
67. See UPA § 31(3), 6 U.L.A. at 376 (listing supervening illegality of partnership activity
as cause of dissolution of partnership); id. § 31(5) (listing bankruptcy of partner as cause of
dissolution of partnership); id. § 31(6) (listing possible dissolution of partnership by adjudication).
68. See Osborne v. Workman, 621 S.W.2d 478, 480-81 (Ark. 1981) (using ARc. CODE
ANN § 65-129 and § 65-131, which allow partners in Arkansas to dissociate and not violate
partnership agreement and therefore avoid damages payable under UPA § 38); Cagnolatti v.
Guinn, 189 Cal. Rptr 151, 155 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (applying CAL. CoRP. CODE § 15031,
which adds subsection to California's adoption of UPA, allowing partners to create agreement
providing for partner withdrawal or admission that does not trigger dissolution).
69. See REuscmlEIN & GREGORY, supra note 5, § 227, at 344 (noting that fiduciary duty
of partner to partnership continues during UPA winding up process but not after partnership
terminates).
70. See Wilzig v. Sisselman, 442 A.2d 1021, 1025 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982)
(noting that death or withdrawal of partner does not preclude remaining partners from
continuing business per partnership agreement, regardless of adding or not adding new
partners); Lonning v. Kurtz, 291 N.W.2d 438, 441 (N.D. 1980) (holding that liquidation need
not occur if partnership agreement provides for continuation of partnership after dissolution
and withdrawing partner is paid both share of partnership profits and for capital contribution);
Woodruff v. Bryant, 558 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (stating that dissolution is
change in legal relationship of original partners and has no significance to continuation or
winding up of partnership business).
71. ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERsEIPs AND LIMITED PARTNERSamPs 83 (4th ed. 1990). Professor Hamilton stated:

It is an observable fact of the modern business world that most partnership
dissolutions are not followed by a period of winding up and termination even when
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or upon termination, does the partnership cease to exist. 72 Section 30 of the

UPA states that the partnership continues after dissolution and terminates
only upon the completion of all partnership affairs. 73 Simply stated, dissolution is a distinct and separate step from the winding up process. 74 A

dissolution of a partnership generally affects only future transactions of the
business, not past transactions. 75 The authority of a partner ceases upon

dissolution except for the proper winding up of partnership
affairs and, in
76
this way, continues until termination of the partnership.

Fidelity Trust Co. v. BVD Associates,7 7 which involved a mortgage
foreclosure suit against a limited partnership, demonstrates the importance
of a judicial finding of partnership dissolution. 78 In Fidelity Trust the
Supreme Court of Connecticut considered whether the replacement of any
or all of the original partners in a limited partnership triggered an acceleration clause in a mortgage on partnership property.79 The membership of
the original partnership had changed through a series of transactions, adding
a general partner and other limited partners and eliminating some limited
partners. 0 The plaintiff mortgage lender argued that the change in mem-

there is no agreement to continue the business. Rather the partnership business is
continued by one or more of the former partners, perhaps with the infusion of new
blood, while the interest of any partners falling by the wayside is liquidated by the
continuing business in some way. The former partners may consent to the continuation or merely accept the fact that it has continued. The reason for this is that
usually the continuation of the business is more sensible, as a matter of simple
business economics, than a piece-meal liquidation and sale of the business assets.
Id.
72. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEtN, supra note 8, § 7.01(b), at 7:6 (stating that upon
termination partnership cannot sue or be sued, all authority of partners to act on behalf of
partnership ceases, and partners no longer have joint rights in partnership property).
73. UPA § 30, 6 U.L.A. at 367.
74. See Ramseyer v. Ramseyer, 558 P.2d 76, 79 (Idaho 1976) (stating that "dissolution"
in partnership law is legal term of art and does not refer to other stages of process by which
all partnership affairs are completed); Babray v. Carlino 276 N.E.2d 435, 442 (Ill. App. Ct.
1971) (noting that dissolution of partnership is entirely distinct from winding up of old
partnership affairs); Ross v. Walsh, 629 S.W.2d 823, 825 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (asserting that
dissolution is only single step in larger process of concluding partnership agreement; other
necessary steps are winding up, termination, and accounting).
75. See Cotten v. Perishable Air Conditioners, 116 P.2d 603, 604 (Cal. 1941) (holding
that partnership continues as to all past transactions but not future); Wilzig v. Sisselman, 442
A.2d 1021, 1024 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982) (same).
76. See Shepherd v. Griffin, 776 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that
all authority of partner to act for partnership ceases at time of dissolution except for acts
proper to wind up partnership affairs); infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text (discussing
limitation of partner authority upon dissolution pursuant to UPA § 33).
77. 492 A.2d 180 (Conn. 1985).
78. See Fidelity Trust Co. v. BVD Assocs., 492 A.2d 180, 183 (Conn. 1985) (stating that
provisions of UPA apply to limited partnerships except where inconsistent).
79. See id. at 182 (stating that mortgage deed contained acceleration clause triggered by
transfer in property ownership).
80. Id.
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bership caused a dissolution of the partnership and represented a conveyance
of the property sufficient to trigger the acceleration clause. 8
The supreme court noted that the relevant state legislative history

demonstrated intent to treat limited partnerships more like a separate legal
entity.

2

Next, the court reasoned that because the limited partnership is

related more closely to a separate legal entity, a change in membership does
not effect a dissolution according to state statutory law, and therefore the

mortgage lender could not accelerate under the terms of the mortgage. 3 If

the partnership in Fidelity Trust had been a general partnership governed
purely by the UPA, a dissolution would have occurred under section 31 of
the UPA,14 and arguably the creditor could have accelerated the payments
under the mortgage terms because the change in membership would have
represented a transfer of the property.
The UPA describes a broad range of situations that result in a dissolution of the partnership."5 Most situations that cause a dissolution may be

81. Id.
82. Id. at 184-86.
83. Id. at 186.

84. See UPA § 31(1)(b), (2), 6 U.L.A. at 376 (stating that dissolution may occur by
withdrawal of partner either in at-will partnership or in partnership with definite purpose or
life span).
85. Id. §§ 31-32, 6 U.L.A. at 376, 394. Section 31, Causes of Dissolution, of the UPA
states in full:
Dissolution is caused:
(1) Without violation of the agreement between the partners, (a) By the termination of the definite term or particular undertaking specified in the agreement,
(b) By the express will of any partner when no definite term or particular
undertaking is specified,
(c) By the express will of all the partners who have not assigned their interests
or suffered them to be charged for their separate debts, either before or after the
termination of any specified term or particular undertaking,
(d) By the expulsion of any partner from the business bona fide in accordance
with such a power conferred by the igreement between the partners;
(2) In contravention of the agreement between the partners, where the circumstances do not permit a dissolution under any other provision of this section, by the
express will of any partner at any time;
(3) By any event which makes it unlawful for the business of the partnership

to be carried on or for the members to carry it on in partnership;
(4) By the death of any partner;
(5) By the bankruptcy of any partner or the partnership;

(6) By decree of court under section 32.
Id. § 31.
Section 32, Dissolution by Decree of Court, states in part:
Dissolution is caused:
(1) On application by or for a partner the court shall decree a dissolution

whenever:
(a) A partner has been declared a lunatic in any judicial proceeding or is shown
to be of unsound mind,
(b) A partner becomes in any other way incapable of performing his part of
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thought of as changes in relation between the partners."6 For example, if

the partners have no agreement to continue the partnership for a specific
period of time or undertaking-an at-will partnership-a partner may withdraw and cause a dissolution without penalty.87 Also, a partner may withdraw from a partnership in violation of an agreement for a specific period
of time or purpose, but the partner must pay any damages caused to the

partnership by the withdrawal."S Hostile conduct between partners may
trigger dissolution.8 9 The death of a partner also triggers dissolution.9
Furthermore, a dissolution may occur in accordance with a partnership
agreement 9' or by supervening illegality of partnership activity. 92 Partnerships
the partnership contract,
(c) A partner has been guilty of such conduct as tends to affect prejudicially
the carrying on of the business,
(d) A partner willfully or persistently commits a breach of the partnership
agreement, or otherwise so conducts himself in matters relating to the partnership
business that is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in partnership
with him,
(e) The business of the partnership can only be carried on at a loss,
(f) Other circumstances render a dissolution equitable.
Id. § 32.
86. See Weidner, supra note 9, at 444 (explaining UPA definition of dissolution as
change in relation between partners and that nature of continued relationship after dissolution
is complicated).
87. See Ford v. Lafayette Life Ins. Co., 362 F.2d 970, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (holding
that withdrawal of one partner from two-person partnership effected dissolution of business);
Medd v. Medd, 291 N.W.2d 29, 33 (Iowa 1980) (holding that voluntary withdrawal of partner
triggered dissolution of partnership); UPA § 31(l)(b), 6 U.L.A. at 376 (stating that partner
may effect dissolution by expressly withdrawing in at-will partnership); infra notes 127-38 and
accompanying text (discussing Robertson v. Southwood, 417 N.W.2d 616 (Neb. 1989), which
involves withdrawal of partner in at-will partnership).
88. See UPA § 31(2), 6 U.L.A. at 376 (noting that partner may withdraw from partnership
in contravention of partnership agreement); id. § 38(2) (stating that remaining partners have
right to damages from withdrawing partner for breach of agreement).
89. See Tembrina v. Simos, 567 N.E.2d 536, 540 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 575
N.E.2d 924 (Ill. 1991) (holding that apparent animosity between partners, refusal of partners
to pay share of real estate taxes, transfer of partnership property to individual partner, and
general unwillingness to cooperate constitute proper grounds for dissolution of partnership);
Susman v. Venture, 449 N.E.2d 143, 148 (II. App. Ct. 1982) (holding that actions of general
partners in treating limited partner as if limited partner had no interest in business necessitated
partnership dissolution).
90. UPA § 31(4), 6 U.L.A. at 376; see United States v. Hankins, 581 F.2d 431, 436
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979) (holding that under Mississippi law and in
absence of continuation agreement, partnership dissolves upon death of partner); Turner v.
Turner, 305 A.2d 592, 596 (Vt. 1973) (stating that death of partner dissolved partnership but
that partnership was not terminated until winding up of business affairs).
91. See UPA § 31(1)(a), 6 U.L.A. at 376 (stating that expiration of definite term or
purpose of partnership causes dissolution); id. § 31(l)(d) (stating that expulsion of partner in
accordance with partnership agreement causes dissolution); supra note 85 (restating UPA §
31(1)(a) and (d), involving dissolution upon termination of time or undertaking and dissolution
due to expulsion of partner per partnership agreement).
92. See UPA § 31(3), 6 U.L.A. at 376 (stating that illegality of partnership business
causes dissolution); supra note 85 (restating UPA § 31(3), involving dissolution caused by
illegality of partnership activity).
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may be dissolved by cooperative action of the partners, 93 by operation of

law, 94 or by judicial action. 95 Importantly, dissolution under the UPA triggers
all the UPA breakup provisions.9
Some key breakup provisions show concern for a withdrawing partner's
ability to choose investment opportunities freely. Because a partner may at
any time dissolve the partnership, including a partnership for a definite

term, by expressly withdrawing, the drafters of the UPA arguably intended
to design a rule protecting an individual partner's interests in the partner-

ship.97 The UPA breakup rules also increase a partner's flexibility to choose
how to invest personal and capital resources. 98 The UPA's approach to the
partnership breakup is consistent with an extreme aggregate theory of
partnership: a partnership is a group of unique individuals and any change
in membership must result in dissolution. 9 In this way, the aggregate theory
of partnership best reflects how a partner in a small business would view a
partnership breakup.'°0 Notably, the UPA breakup provisions act as default
rules that automatically declare dissolutions under various circumstances,
although the dissolution may not result in a termination of the partnership
itself.'0 1
93. See UPA § 31(l)(c), 6 U.L.A. at 376 (stating that express will of all partners to
dissolve effects dissolution of partnership); supra note 85 (restating UPA § 31(l)(c), involving
dissolution caused by complete agreement of all remaining partners, regardless of termination
date or completion of partnership purpose).
94. See UPA § 31(5), 6 U.L.A. at 376 (stating that bankruptcy of partner causes
dissolution of partnership); supra note 85 (restating UPA § 31(5), involving dissolution caused
by bankruptcy of partner or partnership).
95. See UPA § 31(6), 6 U.L.A. at 376 (referring to UPA § 32 for dissolution by court
order); id. § 32 (listing various situations by which court may order dissolution upon partner
application); supra note 85 (restating UPA § 31(6), addressing dissolution caused by partner
initiating judicial proceeding to dissolve partnership through pertinent subsection of UPA §
32); supra note 85 (restating UPA § 32, which lists various causes of action, such as criminal
guilt of partner or adverse mental condition of partner, for which partner may apply to court
for decree dissolving partnership).
96. See Weidner, supra note 9, at 435 (lliscussing definitions of what dissolution is and
what it is not and noting that all UPA breakup provisions are activated by dissolution).
97. See BROMBERO & RismN, supra note 8, § 7.01(d)(1), at 7:9 (stating that without
dissolution at will partner may be "hostage" of hostile partnership and that fiduciary duties
may not satisfactorily protect interests of hostage partner); Rodman Elfin, Revision of the
Uniform PartnershipAct, An Analysis and Recommendations, 23 IND. L. REV. 655, 663 (1990)
(noting that advantage of right to cause dissolution at will is protection against exploiting
conduct by managing partner or majority of partners).
98. See BROMBERG & RmsTEm, supra note 8, § 7.01(d)(1), at 7:10 (noting that benefit
of dissolution at will is increased marketability of partnership interest, and dissolution at will
also protects partner's monetary and human resources because individual partner can best
determine investment of these resources).
99. See id. § 7.01(a) (explaining that concept of delectus personarum-partnersmay
select their associates-underlies ease with which partnership may be dissolved and stating that
ease of dissolution is consistent with extreme aggregate theory of partnership).
100. See Weidner, supra note 9, at 433 (stating that small partnerships are more personal,
as is aggregate theory of partnership); id. (stating that small business parties often document
their arrangements in "aggregate" terms).
101. See Rich v. Class, 643 S.W.2d 872, 875-76 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that under
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The instability of a partnership under the UPA has been the major
source of criticism of the breakup provisions.' 0 2 Indeed, Dean Weidner
believes that the UPA actually destabilizes partnerships, especially those

with continuation agreements.' 3 A related criticism is that the costs of
°4
allowing dissolution at will are too high in comparison with the benefits.'
The aggregate theory of partnership underlying the UPA breakup provisions

may cause this instability.'
B.

5

UPA Authority of Partner upon Dissolution

The effects of dissolution on the authority of a partner are fairly
straightforward.' °0 All authority of any partner to act for the partnership
and therefore to bind the other partners ceases upon dissolution of the
partnership, except to the extent necessary to wind up the partnership
affairs.' 7 Daniels Trucking, Inc. v. Rogers'0 illustrates the importance of

partnership agreement partners may continue partnership when normally partnership would
dissolve due to event of dissolution); supra note 71 and accompanying text (noting continuation
of most partnerships after dissolution).
102. See UPA Revision Subcommittee, Revision?, supra note 8, at 125-26 (summarizing
proposed amendments to breakup provisions of UPA); Weidner, supra note 9, at 437-38
(stating that UPA destabilizes partnerships, especially those that have partnership agreements
providing for continuation after dissolution). Some of the recommendations from the UPA
Revision Subcommittee are: (1) specifically authorizing through partnership agreement ability
of remaining partner(s) to buy out withdrawing partner(s) interest; (2) deleting bankruptcy of
a partner as cause of dissolution; (3) specifically allowing admission of new partner to
partnership without causing dissolution; (4) eliminating right of assignee of partnership interest
to obtain court ordered dissolution; and (5) specifically authorizing court in dissolution suit
to order remedies other than dissolution. UPA Revision Subcommittee, Revision?, supra note
8, at 124-26.
103. Weidner, supra note 9, at 437-38.
104. See BROMBERG & Rmsasni, supra note 8, § 7.01(d)(2), at 7:11 (criticizing UPA for
allowing withdrawing partner to inflict high costs on remaining partners who wish to continue
business and theorizing that withdrawing partner may take over partnership through threat of
dissolution or result in forced sale of substantial firm assets or enable withdrawing partner to
renegotiate original partnership agreement at unfair advantage); Elfin, supra note 97, at 66266 (analyzing benefits and costs of present UPA allowance of forced liquidation of at-will
partnership by withdrawing partner and comparing benefits in proposed option of buyout of
withdrawing partner(s) interest at fair market value).
105. See BROMBERG & RnsTnin, supra note 8, § 7.01(d)(2), at 7:12 (stating that threat of
dissolution destabilizes initial partnership bargaining process); Weidner, supra note 9, at 43538 (discussing instability of partnership business caused by aggregate theory of partnership in
UPA).
106. See UPA § 33, 6 U.L.A. at 423 (giving general statement limiting authority of all
partners after dissolution). Section 33, General Effect of Dissolution on Authority of Partner,
of the UPA states in part: "Except so far as may be necessary to wind up partnership affairs
or to complete transactions begun but not then finished, dissolution terminates all authority
of any partner to act for the partnership ......
Id.
107. See Egner v. States Realty Co., 26 N.W.2d 464, 468-69 (Minn. 1947) (stating that
dissolution ends ability of partner to represent partnership and only during the existence of
partnership can partner execute authorization for partnership); Shepherd v. Griffin, 776 S.W.2d
119, 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that upon dissolution all authority of any partner to

1993]

REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT

terminating partner authority upon dissolution. In Daniels Trucking the

Kansas Court of Appeals considered whether a partner of a dissolved
partnership had authority to convey title of partnership property to a creditor
of the partnership. 1' 9 The two partners operated a trucking company and
had leased a trailer to Daniels Trucking." 0 Subsequently, the partners
decided to dissolve the partnership, and the partners agreed to divide the
partnership property."' One partner, Rogers, took possession of the leased

trailer and secured title in his personal name." 2 The other partner, Noble,
became an employee of Daniels Trucking, and without Roger's compliance,
transferred title of the trailer to Daniels Trucking for repayment of a debt
owed by the partnership."' Because the agreement to split the partnership

property did not prejudice Daniels Trucking, the court of appeals found
the agreement valid. 114 Consequently, the court held that Noble had no
authority to convey title to Daniels Trucking after dissolution."' The termination of every partner's authority to act on behalf of the partnership
protects the interests of partners after dissolution under the UPA.
C.

UPA Continuing Liability of Partners

Section 36 of the UPA is basically a codification of the common-law
rule of continuing liability for partners: dissolution by itself does not
6
discharge a withdrawing partner's personal liability for predissolution debts."
A partner may withdraw from the partnership, but still incur personal
liability for transactions begun before withdrawal or for liabilities incurred

act for partnership business terminates except as to winding up partnership affairs); Shannon
v. Monasco, 632 S.W.2d 946, 948 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that both authority of partner
to act on behalf of partnership and agency relationship emanating from partnership relationship
ended immediately upon dissolution).
108. 643 P.2d 1108 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982).
109. Daniels Trucking, Inc. v. Rogers, 643 P.2d 1108, 1110 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982).
110. Id. at 1109.
I11. Id. at 1109-10.
112. Id. at 1110.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Reuschlein & Gregory, supra note 5, § 234, at 360-61 (stating that UPA § 36 is
basic codification of common-law rules and that dissolution does not extinguish liability).
Section 36 of the UPA, Effect of Dissolution on Partner's Existing Liability, states in
part:
(1) The dissolution of the partnership does not of itself discharge the existing
liability of any partner.
(2) A partner is discharged from any existing liability upon dissolution of the
partnership by an agreement to that effect between himself, the partnership creditor
and the person or partnership continuing the business; and such agreement may be
inferred from the course of dealing between the creditor having knowledge of the
dissolution and the person or partnership continuing the business.
UPA § 36, 6 U.L.A. at 436.
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in the process of winding up." 7 Moreover, under section 35, a creditor who
extends credit to the partnership without notice or knowledge of a partner's
withdrawal or of dissolution can rightfully assert a claim against a withdrawn
partner."' However, a withdrawing partner may escape future liability by
entering into an agreement, or novation, with the partnership or person
continuing the business and the creditor." 9 A court also might infer such a
novation from a course of dealing between a creditor who knows of the
120
dissolution and the persons continuing the partnership.

117. See Delfin v. Harry Liss & Assocs., Inc., 365 F.2d 74, 76-77 (9th Cir. 1966) (holding
that partner may be held personally liable for purchase of furniture and equipment and finding
that purchase was transaction appropriate for winding up partnership affairs because negotiations were begun before dissolution and because after negotiations, plaintiff sent goods on
open account); Redman v. Walters, 152 Cal. Rptr. 42, 44-45 (Ct. App. 1979) (holding that
attorney who resigned from law partnership was liable for plaintiff malpractice claim because
case was acquired during time of partners association with business and liability continues on
any unfinished business of partnership, including the plaintiff client's case with law partnership);
Hartford Fin. Sys. v. Florida Software Serv., Inc., 550 F. Supp. 1079, 1089 (D. Me. 1982),
appeal dismissed, 712 F.2d 724 (Ist Cir. 1983) (holding that for purposes of UPA § 36 the
term "existing liability" refers to every obligation incurred by partnership, regardless of type
and ultimate time of maturity, so long as obligation is incurred before termination of
partnership)
118. UPA § 35 (b)(I), 6 U.L.A. at 429; see Sta-Rite Indus., Inc..v. Taylor, 492 P.2d 726,
727 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (finding that partnership would be bound if creditor extended credit
without notice or knowledge of partnership's dissolution).
Section 35 of the UPA, Power of Partner to Bind Partnership to Third Persons after
Dissolution, states in part:
(1) After dissolution a partner can bind the partnership ...
(a) By any act appropriate for winding up partnership affairs or completing
transactions unfinished at dissolution;
(h) By any transaction which would bind the partnership if dissolution had not
taken place, provided the other party to the transaction
(I) Had extended credit to the partnership prior to dissolution and had no
knowledge or notice of the dissolution; or
(II) Though he had not so extended credit, had nevertheless known of the
partnership prior to dissolution, and, having no knowledge or notice of dissolution,
the fact of dissolution had not been advertised in a newspaper of general circulation
in the place (or in each place if more than one) at which the partnership business
was regularly carried on.
UPA § 35, 6 U.L.A. at 429.
119. See Colo-Tex Leasing, Inc. v. Neitzert, 746 P.2d 972, 974-75 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987)
(stating that agreement between partner, remaining partners, and partnership creditor discharges
partner from existing liability); Wester & Co. v. Nestle, 669 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Colo. Ct. App.
1983) (holding that dissolution itself does not exempt withdrawing partner from liability but
agreement can discharge liability); Longley Supply Co. v. Styron, 214 S.E.2d 777, 779 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1975) (finding that because partnership dissolution agreement failed to address
resulting liability after dissolution, agreement was inapplicable and relevant UPA section
applied, which stated that partners were liable for losses in proportion to their share in profits);
UPA § 36(2), 6 U.L.A. at 436 (stating that agreement between withdrawing partner, partners
continuing business, and partnership creditor will discharge partner from liability).
120. See Wester & Co. v. Nestle, 669 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that
agreement discharging partner from liability may be inferred from course of dealing between
creditor having knowledge of dissolution and partners continuing business).
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Sections 35 and 36, which concern partner liability after dissolution,
reflect two factors that tend to complicate the continued liability of a
withdrawing partner.' 2 ' First, partners are personally liable to contract and
tort creditors of the partnership.'2 Second, a general agency relationship
exists between a partner and the partnership.'2 This means that a partner
cannot merely quit and thereby immediately end the relationship.'2 Again,
a partner's liability continues as to unfinished business and for business
obligations incurred in any winding up.1 5 The partnership relation continues,
26
although the nature of the relation has changed.'
Robertson v. Southwood,' 7 which involved a real estate partnership,
illustrates the continued liability of partners under the UPA. In Robertson
the Supreme Court of Nebraska considered whether a withdrawing partner,
Robertson, was free from partnership liability incurred during the winding
up period.'2 Robertson involved an at-will partnership 2 9 between twelve

real estate agents. 30 During the course of business, the partnership became
insolvent, and a creditor demanded payment on an overdue note.' After
32
notice of the debt, Robertson wrote a letter resigning from the partnership.
Although the partnership agreement required equal capital contributions
from the partners, Robertson failed to pay, forcing the remaining partners

121. See Weidner, supra note 9, at 443 (stating that two features-personal liability on
all partnership debts and agency relationship between partner and partnership-of partnership
relationship tend to make buyout of partnership interest more complicated and winding up of
partnership more complicated than analogous situations within corporate form of business).
122. See UPA § 15(a), 6 .L.A. at 174 (stating joint and several liability for each partner);
Weidner, supra note 9, at 443 (noting that as opposed to shareholder of corporation, partners
are personally liable for business debts).
123. UPA § 31 cmt., 6 U.L.A. at 377; see Weidner, supra note 9, at 443 (stating that
partners are general agents of partnership). The Official Comment of the UPA § 31 states:
The relation of partners is one of agency. The agency is such a personal one
that equity cannot enforce it even where the agreement provides that the partnership
shall continue for a definite time. The power of any partner to terminate the relation,
even though in doing so he breaks a contract, should, it is submitted, be recognized.
UPA § 31 cmt., 6 U.L.A. at 377.
124. See Weidner, supra note 9, at 443 (discussing difficulty of partner to immediately
sever self from liability of obligations entered into before dissolution).
125. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (giving several examples of continuing
liability).
126. See Weidner, supra note 9, at 443-44 (discussing complicated nature of change in
relationship of partner after withdrawal); supra notes 85-87, 89-96 and accompanying text
(discussing UPA § 29 and change in relation concept of dissolution).
127. 417 N.W.2d 616 (Neb. 1989).
128. Robertson v. Southwood, 447 N.W.2d 616, 618-19 (Neb. 1989).
129. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (giving examples of withdrawal in at-will
partnership and giving definition of at-will partnership).
130. Robertson, 447 N.W.2d at 618; see UPA § 31(1)(b), 6 U.L.A. at 376 (showing that
in at-will partnership, partner may dissolve partnership at any time without violating agreement).
131. Robertson, 447 N.W.2d at 618-19.
132. Id. at 619.
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to extend his share of the debt.' Subsequently, the partnership incurred
13 4
further debt.
The Robertson court stated that absent a dissolution agreement discharging Robertson from liability, Robertson would be liable for the debts
of the partnership regardless of dissolution. 3 ' However, the partnership did
have such an agreement, and so the supreme court also considered whether
Robertson satisfied the appropriate provisions discharging him from liability. 36 The supreme court reasoned that Robertson's letter effected a dissolution, but until Robertson paid his equal share of the partnership debt,
which was a condition of the agreement discharging liability, the partnership
was not terminated.13 7 Because the supreme court found that Robertson did
not satisfy the dissolution requirements in the agreement, the court held
that Robertson was liable for his share of losses and remanded the case for
a proper accounting. 3 8
III.

REVISED UNIFoRM PARTNERSHIP ACT BREAKUP PRovIsIoNs

A.

In General

The RUPA completely revises the rules governing partnership breakups. 13 9 The language of the RUPA is different and some fundamental terms
are new. 14 The Drafting Committee intended the new breakup provisions
to provide greater clarity in distinguishing between breakups or dissociations
that trigger a buyout and those that trigger a termination of the partnership
business.' 4' By adding clarity, the Drafting Committee also hoped to increase
stability for partnerships that had contracted for stability. 142 Furthermore,
because the Drafting Committee intended to increase the importance of the

133. Id. at 618-19.
134. Id. at 619.
135. Id. at 620.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 620-22.
139. Weidner, supra note 9, at 431 (stating that RUPA contains complete revision of
breakup rules).
140. See REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 601 (Proposed Official Draft 1992) (listing
various events of RUPA's "dissociation"); REviSED UNIF. PARTNERsHip ACT § 601 cmt.
(Proposed Official Draft 1991) (stating that upon dissociation partnership is not "dissolved");
infra notes 238-47 and accompanying text (comparing UPA's "dissolution" and RUPA's
"dissociation").
141. Weidner, supra note 9, at 439 (discussing intent of RUPA breakup provisions). Dean
Weidner stated: "A partnership breakup can result in a winding up of the partnership business
or in a buyout of the departing partner. RUPA attempts to identify and clearly define these
two tracks." Id.
142. Id.
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partnership agreement, only a limited number of the RUPA's breakup
provisions will act as mandatory rules. 43
44
The RUPA contains the breakup provisions in three separate articles.'
Article six lists all the events that cause the dissociation of a partner.' 4
Article seven is the residual or "clean-up" section that mandates a buyout
of the dissociated partner's interest if no winding up occurs under article
eight.'" Article eight lists a limited number of events that cause a winding
up and termination of the partnership-in other words, a true liquidation
of the assets. 47 Together, the three articles encourage buyouts of partnership
interests rather than a winding up and termination.' 48 The RUPA provisions
are greater in length and more detailed than those of the UPA, supposedly
49
adding clarity to the rules.'
Perhaps the most fundamental change of the RUPA is a greater emphasis on the entity theory of partnership.'5 0 Of course, such a fundamental
shift in the theoretical foundations of partnership law will have a key effect
on subsequent statutory enactments of the RUPA and the outcome of case
law relying on the new and fundamentally different partnership statute.,

143. See REVISED UNIr. PARTNEaRSaHI ACT § 103 (Proposed Official Draft 1992) (listing
various mandatory provisions and provisions that partners may not "unreasonably" vary);
Weidner, supra note 9, at 454 (stating that Drafting Committee intended partnership agreement
to be supreme in almost all situations, and professing that mandatory rules are parentalistic
and undesirable because adults should be held to their bargains).
144. See REVISED UNI. PARTNERsHmP ACT arts. 6-8 (Proposed Official Draft 1992) (dividing
separate breakup procedures).
145. Id. art. 6.
146. Id. § 701. The order of the paths or processes seems somewhat awkward because
one might expect a "cleanup" provision to be at the end of the breakup provisions. The
Drafting Committee may have chosen to place the "cleanup" section, § 701, before the rules
governing dissolution and termination, article 8, because article 8 supposedly deals with a
definite dissolution of the partnership.
147. See id. § 801 (listing events of RUPA "dissolution").
148. See id. § 701(a) (stating that if partnership is not "dissolved" pursuant to § 801,
remaining partners must buyout withdrawing partner's interest); REviSED UNiP. PARTNERsHiP
ACT § 801 commentary at 116 (Proposed Official Draft 1991) (stating that ninety day "cooling
off" period mandated by § 802 encourages buyouts of withdrawing partner by allowing
negotiations between remaining partners and withdrawing partners).
149. See Weidner, supra note 9, at 453 (stating that RUPA's greater length adds specificity
and clarity).
150. See id. at 430-32 (discussing general changes and fundamental changes to breakup
provisions that reflect entity theory of partnership).
Other authority calling for greater emphasis of the entity theory of partnership predates
the RUPA. See Ribstein, supra note 12, at 364-68 (describing new statutory approach to
partner dissociation versus dissolution that would reduce dissolvability of partnerships); UPA
Revision Subcommittee, Revision?, supra note 8, at 124-26 (recommending increased emphasis
on entity approach and summarizing recommended revisions to UPA dissolution rules, many
of which are apparent in RUPA); Weidner, supra note 9, at 427 (noting similarity of 1986
ABA subcommittee recommendations to changes incorporated in Georgia's enactment of UPA
in 1984).

151. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing fundamental effect conceptual
theories of partnership may have on partnership law).
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Businesses that use the partnership form will have to adapt business practices
or contract around the new RUPA default rules. 5 2 For instance, many new
partnerships will want to avoid the ninety day delay provisions of section
53
802, which affect the withdrawal of partners in an at-will partnership.
1. RUPA Terminology: Dissociation vs. Dissolution
The RUPA introduces a new term in partnership law: dissociation. 5 4
Dissociation indicates that an event involving a partner has occurred that
fundamentally changes the partner's willingness or ability to continue business as usual.155 Some of the events listed in article six include: (1) a
partner's notice of withdrawal; (2) a specified event in the partnership
agreement; (3) a partner's expulsion either in accordance with the partnership
agreement or by unanimous agreement among the partners due to another
event, such as a transfer of the partner's interest, or expulsion by judicial
decree; (4) a partner's bankrupfcy; and (5) a partner's death or incapacity
to carry on business in accordance with the partnership agreement 5 6 Importantly, if the partners do not contract otherwise, section 601 of the
RUPA does not automatically declare a winding up and termination 5 7 and,
in effect, potentially notifies third parties that one of two processes will
occur.' 5 The resulting process is either a buyout under article seven or59
actual termination and liquidation of partnership assets under article eight.

152. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing importance and effect of

theoretical approaches to partnership form of business). In order for partnerships to avoid
any undesired results under the RUPA, attorneys will have to contract "around" the RUPA
rules.
153. See REv sED UNIF. PARTNi RHiP ACT § 802 (Proposed Official Draft 1992) (discussing
ninety day delay period).

154. See id. § 601 (listing events of dissociation); REVISED UNo. PARTNERStaP ACT § 601
cmt. (Proposed Official Draft 1991) (stating that § 601 lists all events that cause dissociation).
155. See REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSmP ACT § 601 (Proposed Official Draft 1992) (listing

-events of dissociation; examples of which include express withdrawal, expulsion, and bankruptcy
of partner).
156. Id.
157. See id. § 103 (listing exclusive number of RUPA provisions that are mandatory);
supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing difference between mandatory and default
rules).
158. See REviSED UNn. PARTNERSHip ACT § 603(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1992) (stating
that either buyout process or termination process will occur). Section 603(a), entitled Effect

of Partner's Dissociation, states in full: "A dissociated partner's interest in the partnership
must be purchased pursuant to Article 7 unless the partner's dissociation results in a dissolution
and winding up of the partnership business under Article 8." Id.
159. Id.; see supra note 158 (quoting language of § 603(a)). The 1991 Proposed Official
Comment to the RUPA stated in part:
Under RUPA, the dissociation of a partner does not necessarily cause a
dissolution and winding up of the business of the partnership. Section 801 identifies
the situations in which the dissociation of a partner causes a winding up of the
business. Section 701 provides that in all other situations there is a buyout of a
partner rather than a windup of the partnership business.
REvisED UN.r.PARNERsEyP ACT § 601 cmt. (Proposed Official Draft 1991).
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Notably, dissociation, instead of dissolution, now acts as the trigger for the
breakup provisions of the RUPA.' 60
Dissolution no longer has the change in relation meaning that it had
under the UPA. 6 ' Instead, dissolution indicates the beginning of a definite
winding up and termination of a partnership. 62 Initial drafts of the RUPA
did not contain the term dissolution, but subsequent drafts do contain the
term in several sections. 63 Apparently, a split among the Drafting Committee
members regarding the inclusion of "dissolution" caused the vacillation.'"
2.

Two Paths to RUPA Breakup

One of the "paths" a partnership may follow after an event of dissociation, listed in section 601, is a liquidation of the partnership under article
eight.1 6 Section 801 lists a limited number of events that result in a
liquidation.'"6 A wrongfully dissociating partner has no access to an article
eight liquidation.' 67 Perhaps the most important provision is a dissociating
partner's right under section 801(1) to force a liquidation in an at-will

160. See REVISED UNri. PARTNERsmP ACT § 601 (Proposed Official Draft 1992) (listing
exclusive number of events that cause dissociation, which in turn triggers effects of either
article seven or eight); supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing how dissolution triggers
effects of UPA breakup provisions).
161. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing change in relation definition
of UPA dissolution); infra notes 227-60 and accompanying text (analyzing similarities and
differences between new and old terminology and potentially confusing results).
162. See REvimED UNis. PARTNERS=P ACT art. 8 (Proposed Official Draft 1992) (governing
dissolution and winding up of partnership); Weidner, supra note 9, at 452-53 (discussing
continued use of RUPA's dissolution and noting new meaning of term as definite beginning
of windup); Weidner, supra note 11, at 847 (same).
163. See REVISED UNIF. PARTNERsmP ACT §§ 603, 801-07 (Proposed Official Draft 1992)
(using "dissolution" or "dissolved" as part of terminology).
164. See Weidner, supra note 9, at 448-53 (discussing background of continued use of
dissolution in RUPA); infra notes 227-60 and accompanying text (criticizing continued use of
dissolution in RUPA and discussing split in Drafting Committee).
165. See REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSmP ACT § 601 cmt. (Proposed Official Draft 1991)
(stating: "Section 801 identifies the situations in which the dissociation of a partner causes a
winding up of the business").
166. See REVISED Uiu. PAmTNERsmsp ACT § 801 (Proposed Official Draft 1992) (governing
dissolution and winding up of partnership business). Section 801 states that the following
events, among others, will cause a dissolution and winding up of the business: (1) express will
of a partner in an at-will partnership; (2)(i) express will of a partner in a partnership for a
definite term or purpose after another partner has wrongfully dissociated pursuant to § 602;
(2)(ii) the express will of all partners in a partnership for a definite term or purpose; (3) a
specified event agreed to in partnership agreement; (4) an event that makes any part of
partnership business illegal; and (5) the application of a partner to a court for a variety of
reasons, including frustration of economic purpose and impracticability due to another partner's
conduct. Id.
167. See id. (listing limited number of events resulting in winding up and termination).
Notably, § 801 does not offer a wrongfully dissociating partner, pursuant to § 603(a), an
opportunity to force a liquidation. Id. However, after a wrongful dissociation, another partner
may force a termination of the partnership under § 801(2)(i) without penalty, although it is
subject to ninety day delay pursuant to § 802. Id. § 801(2)(i).

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:905

partnership upon giving express notice.' 68 The Official Comments to the
RUPA state that section 801(1) is supposed to continue the rule under the

UPA that a member of an at-will partnership may force a liquidation.

69

Similarly, by not allowing a wrongfully dissociating partner access to article

eight, the RUPA continues the rule that a partner cannot force a liquidation
of a partnership before the expiration of an agreed upon date or in

contravention of the partnership agreement. 70 Also, under section 801(2)(i),
a partner in a partnership for a definite term or particular undertaking may
force a liquidation if another partner wrongfully dissociates' 7 ' or if another
fundamental change occurs in a partner's ability or willingness to carry on
as usual.

172

Section 802 is a wholly new provision and acts as a "break" before a

3
dissolution and forced liquidation pursuant to sections 801(1) and 801(2)(i).'7

Section 802 provides for a mandatory, ninety day delay of the dissolution
prescribed under sections 801(1) and 801(2)(i). 74 Section 802(a) supposedly
168. See id. § 801(l) (governing dissolution of partnership after withdrawal of partner in
at-will partnership). Section 801 states in part:
A partnership is dissolved, and its business must be wound up, only upon:
except as provided in Section 802, receipt by a partnership at will of notice from a
partner, other than a partner who is dissociated under Section 601(2) to (10), of
that partner's express will to withdraw as a partner, or upon any later date specified
in the notice....
Id.
169. See REVISED UNm. PARTNERsmr ACT § 801 commentary at 115-16 (Proposed Official
Draft 1991) (discussing disagreement between Drafting Committee and ABA Ad Hoc Committee
regarding ability of partner in at-will partnership to dissolve partnership).
170. See id. § 801 commentary at 114 (discussing continuation of rule that in partnership
for definite term, remaining partners may buyout wrongfully dissociating partner).
171. See REVISED UNiF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 801(2)(i) (Proposed Official Draft 1992)
(governing dissolution after another partner wrongfully dissociates pursuant to § 602).
172. See id. (referring to §§ 601(2)-601(10) for possible trigger of dissolution); id. §§
601(2)-601(10) (listing various events, such as expulsion, death, or bankruptcy of partner, that
would in accordance with § 801(2)(i) allow another partner to dissolve partnership).
173. See id. § 802 (governing ninety day delay period pursuant to § 801(1) and § 801(2)(i)).
The Proposed Official Comments to the RUPA state in part:
Simply put, in two situations it (section 802) defers for 90 days a partner's right
under Section 801 to have the partnership dissolved and its business wound up. First
and foremost, it defers for 90 days the right of a partner at will to have the business
wound up. In this regard, Section 802 represents something of a compromise between
the two divergent views regarding the right of a partner at will to have the partnership
business liquidated upon her dissociation.
REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSmP ACT § 802 cmt. (Proposed Official Draft 1991) (clarification
added).
174. REVISED UNIt. PARTNERSmP ACT § 802(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1992). Section
802(a) states in part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) (allowing immediate dissolution by onehalf of all partners), a partnership of more than two persons is not dissolved until
90 days after receipt by the partnership of notice from a partner under Section
801(1) or (2)(i) and its business may be continued until that date as if no notice
were received.
Id. (clarification added).
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effects a compromise that maintains the right of the partner to force a
liquidation, but slows down the process in order to give the partnership
time to evaluate the situation and possibly offer to buy the dissociating
partner's interest.175 .The Drafting Committee had some concerns with avoiding a technical dissolution that might set off an undesired effect, such as
triggering a loan acceleration clause, and therefore expressly stated that the
partnership "is not dissolved until 90 days after receipt by the partnership
of notice from a partner.1 176 Notably, all the provisions under section 802
are default rules.

177

Some events leading to liquidation listed in section 801 are not subject
to delay pursuant to section 802.178 These events partially include: (1) a
specified event in the partnership agreement; (2) illegality of partnership
business; (3) judicial determination that the economic purpose will be
unreasonably frustrated; and (4) judicial determination that it is not otherwise practicable to continue business according to the partnership agreement. 179 Most of the provisions of section 801 are default rules and therefore
variable under a partnership agreement. 10
The other path that a partnership may follow after a dissociation is a
partnership buyout of the dissociating partner's interest.' 8' Section 701 is
the primary provision and provides that a mandatory purchase of the
dissociating partner's interest shall occur if there is no termination and
winding up under section 801 .182 In effect, section 701 is the residual or

175. See REVISED UNIF. PARTNRSHP ACT § 802 cmt. (Proposed Official Draft 1991)
(discussing delay provisions of § 802). The Proposed Official Comments state in part:
Section 802 effects a compromise which preserves the absolute right of a partner
at will to have the business liquidated, but slows down the dissolution process to
give the remaining partners an opportunity to assess the effect of the dissociating
partner's departure and to negotiate with her about a buyout n lieu of a liquidation
if they wish to continue the business.
Id.
176. REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIm ACT § 802(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1992); see REVISED
UNr. PArESHIsP ACT § 802 cmt. (Proposed Official Draft 1991) (discussing intent of
Drafting Committee to avoid technical dissolutions).
177. See REVISED UNIt. PARTNERsmP ACT § 103(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1992)
(discussing mandatory RUPA provisions); infra notes 269-73, 281-85 and accompanying text
(discussing potentially adverse effect of default rules on small partnerships).
178. Compare REVISED UNIF. PARTNEsmP ACT §§ 801(2)(ii)-(iii), (3)-(6) (Proposed Official
Draft 1992) (noting those events triggering dissolution that are not subject to delay period)
with id. § 802(a) (applying ninety day delay period to § 801(1) and § 801(2)(i)).
179. See id. §§ 801(2)(ii)-(iii), (3)-(6) (listing those events not triggering delay period).
180. See id. § 103(b) (discussing those RUPA provisions that are mandatory). The
Proposed Official Comments state in part: "With the exception of subsections (4), (5), and
(6), the provisions of Section 801 are merely default rules and may be varied in the partnership
agreement." REVISED UNIF. PARTNERsHIP ACT § 801 commentary at 114 (Proposed Official
Draft 1991).
181. See REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHI ACT § 701 (Proposed Official Draft 1992) (governing
buyout of partnership interest).
182. Id. § 701. Section 701(a) states in full: "(a) If a partner is dissociated from a
partnership without resulting in a dissolution and winding up of the partnership business under
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clean-up section for partnership breakups because it takes effect if the
breakup does not qualify under section 801.1'1 Section 701 also provides for
a method of valuing a dissociating partner's interest.' If the partnership
and dissociating partner do not reach an agreement regarding payment
within 120 days of a written demand, the partnership must pay to the
dissociating partner the partnership's estimate of the buyout price and
85
accrued interest.
B.

RUPA Actual Authority of Partner Upon Dissociation

Section 603(b) is the primary section governing the authority of a
dissociating partner.8 6 Under section 603(b), the dissociating partner's right
to participate in the control of the partnership terminates immediately upon
dissociation. 8 7 This narrower result is in contrast to the UPA's cessation
of partnership authority.' The UPA generally provides that every partner's
authority ceases to exist upon dissolution, except for those acts deemed
necessary to wind up existing business. 8 9 However, similarly to the UPA,
section 603(b) allows a dissociating partner to participate in the winding up
of the partnership pursuant to section 804.190 A partner giving notice of an
express will to withdraw under section 801(1) or 801(2)(i)' 91 incurs the same
restriction of management control, except as to the winding up of the
partnership. 92
Although the termination of a partner's right to participate in the
control of the partnership is similar under section 603(b) and sections 801(1)
and 801(2)(i), the RUPA does not release-or allay-a dissociating partner
under sections 801(1) and 801(2)(i) from duties delineated in section 404 of

Section 801, the partnership shall cause the dissociated partner's interesi in the partnership to
be purchased for a buyout price determined pursuant to subsection (b)." Id.
183. See REVISED UsF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 701 cmt. (Proposed Official Draft 1991)
(stating that § 701 applies when no dissolution and winding up occurs pursuant to § 801).
184. See REVISED UNrF. PARTNERSHP ACT § 701(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1992) (giving
fairly detailed procedure for valuing departing partner's interest in partnership business);
REVSED UNIT. PARmERs8HP ACT § 701 cmt. (Proposed Official Draft 1991) (stating that
Drafting Committee intended to give more specific guidance than UPA in valuing partnership
interest).
185. See REVISED UNIT. PARTNERsiP ACT § 701(e) (Proposed Official Draft 1992) (stating
that in-cash buyout must occur within 120 days if parties cannot agree).
186. See id.§ 603(b) (extinguishing only dissociating partner's authority after dissociation).
187. Id.
188. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing and quoting language of UPA

§ 33).
189. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (giving examples of UPA cessation of all
partners' authority except for purposes of winding up partnership affairs).
190. See REVISED UirF. PARTNERI P, ACT § 603(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1992)
(referring to § 804 to allow dissociating partner right to participate in winding up).
191. See supra notes 165-72 and accompanying text (discussing RUPA §§ 801(1), 801(2)(i)).
192. See REWSED UF. PARTERmSmP ACT § 802(c)(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1992)
(extinguishing departing partner's authority to act for partnership during ninety day delay
period).

1993]

REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT

the RUPA-entitled "General Standards of Partner's Conduct."' 93 Section
603(b) terminates a dissociating partner's duty-pursuant to section 404(b)(3)
to refrain from competing against the former partnership "in the conduct
of the partnership business."' 194 However, section 802(c), which generally
governs the rights of the departing partner during the ninety day delay
period, has no similar provisions allowing a partner to compete. 195 In other
words, a withdrawing partner in an at-will partnership cannot compete and
remains fully duty-bound during the ninety day delay period of section 802.
Interestingly, the RUPA does afford a wrongfully dissociating partner access
to the duty terminations of section 603(b).1 96 Neither section 603(b) or
197
section 801(1) or 801(2)(i) are mandatory rules.
C. RUPA Continuing Liability of Partner
1. Continuing Liability Under Articles Seven and Eight
Dean Weidner has stated that the Drafting Committee did not intend
to change the result of cases involving the continuing liability of partners. 19
Instead, the RUPA seeks to state more directly the obligations of partners
in regards to unfinished business.? 99 Article seven and article eight have
separate provisions for the continuing liability of partnerships, although the
general outcome of continued 2 liability
for previously incurred obligations
°
under each article is the same. 0
Section 703 continues the rule that the departure of a partner does not
by itself release the partner from liability. 201 The Drafting Committee based
193. See id. §§ 404(b)(1)-(3), 404(d) (listing partner duties, some of which § 603(b) relaxes
or terminates for departing partner).
194. Id. § 404(b)(3); see id. § 603(b) (terminating duty under § 404(b)(3) not to compete
with partnership).
195. See id. § 802(c) (listing rules governing withdrawing partner's rights during ninety
day delay period); id. (lacking any mention of release from duty not to compete).
One could argue that § 603(b) applies to those-partners caught in the "limbo" of § 802's
delay period. In this way, a partner might be able to compete. However, this is not consistent
with the theoretical idea behind § 802-keeping partners involved in the partnership for
purposes of encouraging buyouts while simultaneously protecting their rights under § 802.
196. See id. § 602 (listing no restriction on wrongfully dissociating partner not to compete);
id. § 603(b) (same).
197. See id. § 103(b) (discussing mandatory RUPA provisions).
198. See Weidner, supra note 9, at 445-46 (discussing partnership liability case example
and stating that Drafting Committee did not intend to change liability rule under RUPA).
199. See id. at 446 (stating that RUPA § 30, now § 803, attempts to clearly define
continuing obligation of partner after dissociation).
200. See REvisED UNIF. PARTNERSuIP ACT §§ 703(a), 803 (Proposed Official Draft 1992)
(stating provisions governing continued liability for withdrawing partner in buyout situation
under article seven and dissolution under article eight); infra notes 201-18 and accompanying
text (discussing continued liability of withdrawing partner under articles seven and eight).
201. See REvisED UNIF. PATNERsm ACT § 703 cmt. (Proposed Official Draft 1991)
(stating that § 703 continues rule that departing partners are not discharged from liability).
Section 703(a) states in part: "A partner's dissociation does not of itself discharge the partner's
liability for a partnership obligation incurred before dissociation." REvISED UNw. PARTNEaSHP
ACT § 703(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1992) (emphasis added).
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section 703 of the RUPA on section 36 of the UPA. 202 The Drafting
Committee intended section 703(a) to clarify the rule that a dissociated
partner is liable only for obligations incurred before dissociation, except

those liabilities described in section 703(b).

203

Section 703(b) protects third

parties who believe the dissociated partner is still a partner and extend credit

to the partnership. 2°4 For example, a third party creditor's extension of
credit to the partnership might rely substantially on the credit history and

strength of the newly dissociated partner. Creditors attempting to hold 20a
dissociated partner liable must demonstrate reliance and lack of notice. 1
Section 703(b) holds dissociated partners liable to third parties for two
years. 201 However, section 704(b) serves to limit dissociating partners' continuing liability by shortening the period for which they can be held liable
from two years to ninety days. 207 In effect, filing under section 704 gives
third party creditors constructive notice of the dissociation. 28 Dissociating
partners therefore have incentive to file a statement of dissociation in
accordance with section 704.209 Notably, section 703(c) continues the basic
rule of UPA section 36(2),210 allowing a dissociating partner to contract for
21
indemnity of partnership obligations if all parties to the transaction agree. '

Section 701 provides that a partnership shall indemnify a dissociating partner
from all liability, except unknown liabilities incurred before dissociation
and liabilities incurred due to the dissociating partner's action after a
dissociation.

21 2

202. See REVISED UNIT. PARTNERSHIP ACT

§

703 cmt. (Proposed Official Draft 1991)

(stating that Drafting Committee based § 703 on UPA § 36).
203. See id. (stating that RUPA § 703(a) amends UPA § 36 in order to clarify rule that
withdrawing partner is liable for obligations entered into before dissociation).
204. See REVISED UNIF. PARTNRsHmP ACT § 703(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1992) (stating
that dissociating partner is liable to third party creditors for two years if reasonable belief and
notice requirements are satisfied by third party).
205. See id. (stating that creditor must satisfy three requirements, two of which are
reasonable belief and lack of notice, in order to hold dissociated partner liable).
206. See id. (stating that continued liability period for dissociated partner under § 703(b)
is two years).

207. See id. § 704(b) (stating that third parties are deemed to have notice of dissociation
after ninety days from filing).
208. See REVISED UNIT. PARTNERsmiP ACT § 703 cmt. (Proposed Official Draft 1991)
(stating that statement of dissociation under § 704 acts as constructive notice to third parties
of dissociation after ninety days from filing).
209. See id. § 704 cmt. (stating that partners have incentive to file statements of dissociation
and that such filings will likely become routine after dissociation). Such filings will raise
transaction costs for those creditors doing business with partnerships.
210. See UPA § 36(2), 6 U.L.A. at 436 (stating that partner may be discharged from
liability by agreement between partner, third party creditor, and partnership).
211. See REVISED UNIF. PARTNERsmp ACT § 703(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1992) (stating
that departing partner may escape liability if partner secures agreement with partnership and
creditor to that effect).
212. See id. § 701(d) (mandating indemnification for dissociating partner for liabilities
"known" to partnership and for partnership liabilities incurred after dissociation). Section
701(d), which applies to buyouts, states in part: "(d) A partnership shall indemnify a dissociated
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Section 803 sheds light on the continuing liability of partners after a
RUPA dissolution or beginning of a winding up and termination. 2 3 The
Drafting Committee patterned section 803 after UPA section 30.214 Section
803 states in full: "A partnership continues after dissolution until the
winding up of its business is completed, at which time the partnership is

terminated."

215 As

previously stated, the Drafting Committee did not intend

the RUPA to alter the outcome of cases concerning the continued liability

of partners previously handled by the UPA. 216 To explain the idea, Dean
Weidner, in discussing the UPA continued liability scheme, stated that upon
dissolution under the UPA the scope of partnership business narrows, but
"perhaps only very slightly. ' 217 Therefore, even a partner who dissociates
in an at-will partnership, effecting a dissolution, and who subsequently
forces a winding up and termination at the end of the ninety day waiting
period-instead of accepting a buyout under article seven-is subject to
continuing liability until all previous business obligations are wound up. 215
2.

Special Rules of Section 802(c)

Section 802(c) lists three rules governing the rights of a dissociating
partner during the ninety day delay of dissolution prescribed by section

802.219 First, section 802(c)(1) immediately acts to cut off any management
control previously held by the withdrawing partner, except for participation
in a winding up on or before the expiration date of the ninety day period. 2 0

partner against all partnership liabilities incurred before the dissociation, except liabilities then
unknown to the partnership, and against all partnership liabilities incurred after the dissociation,
except liabilities incurred by an act of the dissociated partner under Section 702." Id.
213. See id. § 803 (stating basic rule of continued relationship between partnership and
dissociating partner after dissolution).
214. See REviSED UIm. PARTNERSIIP ACT § 803 cmt. (Proposed Official Draft 1991)
(stating that Drafting Committee drew § 803 from UPA § 30); supra note 73 and accompanying
text (explaining definition of UPA § 30).
215. REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHw ACT § 803 (Proposed Official Draft 1992).
216. See supra note 198 and accompanying text (noting intent of Drafting Committee to
continue rule of UPA § 36 concerning partner liability for transactions entered into prior to
dissociation).
217. Weidner, supra note 9, at 444.
218. See supra notes 127-38 and accompanying text (discussing Robertson case that
demonstrates continued liability concept under UPA); infra notes 279-86 and accompanying
text (discussing continued liability under RUPA by way of hypothetical case example).
219. See REviSED UNIF. PARTNERsm ACT § 802(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1992) (listing
three rules governing rights and liabilities of partner subject to ninety day delay period of §
802). In explanation of § 802, the Proposed Official Comments to the RUPA state:
Basically, it treats the dissociated partner as if she were dissociated under section
601 and being bought out under Article 7, rather than liquidating under Article 8.
If, after 90 days, the business is dissolved and wound up, her usual rights and duties
as a partner are reinstated.
REviSED UNI. PARTNE sHw ACT § 802 commentary at 125 (Proposed Official Draft 1991).
220. See REvISED UNIP. PARTmNasmiP ACT § 802(c)(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1992)
(cutting off withdrawing partner's right of management and control).
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Second, section 802(c)(2) supposedly balances this loss of control by limiting
liability to third parties as prescribed by section 703(b). 221 Section 703(b)
requires third party creditors to show reasonable belief and lack of notice
in order to hold a dissociated partner personally liable. 222 The partnership
must indemnify the dissociating partner from partner conduct deemed
inappropriate for winding up the partnership business.m However, and most
important, the dissociating partner may still be liable to third parties for
those transactions entered into during the ninety day period. 22 4 Third, section
802(c)(3) freezes the dissociating partner's capital account in the following
manner: the partnership must credit the partner's account for the relative
share of any profits made during the ninety day period and can deduct
losses incurred during the period only from that share of profits.22 In this
manner, section 803(c)(3) protects the dissociating partner from incurring
any further losses than those at the beginning of the period-in other words,
section 803(c)(3) provides a floor below which the partner's capital account
226
may not drop.
IV.

ANALYSIS OF RUPA BREAKLup PROVISIONS

At this point, critical analysis and commentary on the latest version of
the RUPA breakup provisions are scarce. Even Dean Weidner's latest article,
which considered the breakup provisions in detail, used a different version
of the RUPA than considered here and was written over two years before
the date of this analysis. Nevertheless, analysis may proceed in at least two
directions: (1) comparative analysis of present UPA terminology and provisions with the new RUPA rules handling related breakup situations, and
(2) determination of possible adverse effects to a withdrawing partner in a
closely held partnership under the RUPA breakup provisions.

221. See id. § 802(c)(2) (limiting liability of withdrawing partner to that prescribed in
RUPA § 703(b) for third party creditors); supra note 204 and accompanying text (discussing
liability under § 703(b)).
222. Id. § 703(b).
223. Id. § 802(c)(2); see REVISED UNs. PART2a~s~mP ACT § 802 cmt. (Proposed Official
Draft 1991) (noting that concept of conduct not appropriate for winding up partnership affairs
has been well developed under UPA § 35(1)(a), which is continued separately by RUPA §

805(1)).
224. See RavisED Utiw. PARTNERsHP ACT § 802 cmt. (Proposed Official Draft 1991)
(explaining continued liability of withdrawing partner in relation to third parties).
225. See REVISED UNN. PARTNERsHIp ACT § 802(c)(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1992)
(explaining procedure by which RUPA attempts to protect withdrawing partner's capital

account). Section 803(c)(3) states in full: "[W]ith respect to profits or losses incurred during
the period, [the withdrawing partner] shall be credited with a share of any profits but shall
be charged with a share of any losses only to the extent of profits credited for the period."
Id.
226. See REVISED UNN. PARTNEasmp ACT § 802 commentary at 125 (Proposed Official
Draft 1991) (explaining procedure of § 802(c)(3) and noting potential difficulty of distinguishing

between transactions entered into during period as either ongoing or winding up).
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A.

The UPA vs. RUPA: Terminology and Confusion

Commentators, including Dean Weidner, when discussing the UPA
breakup provisions, commonly lament the confusion caused by the UPA
definition of dissolution. 227 In fact, confusion in the law governing partnerships seems to be the catalyst for legal revision in the area.2 In addressing
the need for revision, Dean Weidner strongly argued that the UPA definition
of dissolution created instability for partnerships. 229 Dean Weidner further
stated that the UPA does not sufficiently distinguish breakups that cause a
winding up and termination and those that do not. 230 Therefore, one can
justifiably ask if the new terminology of the RUPA will lower confusion
involving partnership breakups and if the RUPA successfully distinguishes
between dissociations that effect partnership termination and those that
effect a buyout of the departing partner's interest with a continuation of
the partnership business.
The primary source of confusion under the UPA breakup provisions
has been the misuse of terminology by attorneys and courts. 231 The UPA
uses unique definitions of dissolution, winding up, and termination. 2 32 Under
the UPA, dissolution activates all the relevant breakup provisions. 231 However, the RUPA redefines dissolution 234 and uses another new term, disso235
ciation, as the trigger to the breakup provisions of the RUPA.
Because confusion in the law of partnership may cause partnership
236
instability, clarity in the law of partnership is of fundamental importance.
Dean Weidner believed the continued use of dissolution in the RUPA will
cause further confusion because the term "dissolution" always has caused

227. See Weidner, supra note 9, at 435 (noting that UPA § 29 definition has caused much
confusion since original drafting of UPA); supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text (discussing
confusion caused by indiscriminate use of UPA terminology and dual concepts of cause and
effect within UPA § 29 definition of dissolution).
228. See supra note 5 (discussing early confusion over diverse case law governing partnerships and need for uniformity that caused development of UPA).
229. See Weidner, supra note 9, at 435-38 (arguing that aggregate conceptual theory of
partnership causes confusion over dissolution).
230. See id. at 437-38 (stating that UPA actually destabilizes partnerships by not adequately
distinguishing between types of partnership breakups).
231. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (discussing confusion of terminology
by business people, attorneys, and courts).
232. See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text (discussing unique definitions and use
of terminology in UPA).
233. See supranote 57 and accompanying text (stating that dissolution activates all breakup
provisions under UPA).
234. See Weidner, supra note 9, at 452-53 (stating new general meaning and effect of
RUPA term "dissolution"); supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text (discussing new RUPA
meaning of "dissolution").
235. See supra notes 154-60 and accompanying text (discussing use of term "dissociation"
as beginning of partnership breakup under RUPA).
236. See Weidner, supra note 9, at 435-38 (discussing how confusion involving UPA has
caused instability to partnerships); supra note 5 (describing early history of UPA and how
confusion may generate need for legal reform).

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:905

37
confusion and the RUPA now defines dissolution in a different manner .
However, the new RUPA terminology will increase confusion not only for
the causes noted by Dean Weidner, but also for the following reasons: (1)
the RUPA adds a new term, dissociation, to the primary lexicon of partnership law; (2) the RUPA, while redefining dissolution, substitutes dissociation for dissolution as the primary trigger to the breakup provisions; and
(3) the distinction between a dissociation that definitely effects a buyout
and one that results in a termination of the partnership is not always clear.
The meaning of the RUPA's "dissociation" is analogous to the present
UPA definition of dissolution. The dissolution of a partnership under the
UPA indicates a change in the relationship between the partners. 28 Although
dissociation is not expressly defined in the RUPA, the various "events" of
dissociation indicate the meaning behind the term. 239 For example, the
withdrawal or expulsion of a partner is an event of dissociation under the
RUPA. 2 Under the UPA one would label these events as dissolutions
because they indicate a changed relation among the partners, and the UPA
lists these events as causes of dissolution. 241 Although the RUPA has declined
to define the term "dissociation," the RUPA's dissociation now has virtually
the same meaning as the UPA's dissolution: the occurrence of some event
altering a partner's willingness or ability to continue in the business. 242
The effect of the RUPA's "dissociation" is also similar to the effect
of dissolution under the UPA. Like the UPA's "dissolution," dissociation
under the RUPA does not indicate the termination of the partnership
business. 243 Dissociation indicates either that the partners continuing the
partnership will purchase the departing partner's interest2 or that the
partnership will terminate and its assets liquidated. 245 Of course, under the

237. See Weidner, supra note 9, at 452 (stating that confusion likely will occur with
RUPA due to continued use of term "dissolution").
238. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (explaining definition of UPA "dissolution").
239. See REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHP ACT § 601 (Proposed Official Draft 1992) (listing
events of dissociation); supra text accompanying note 156 (discussing and noting various events
of dissociation under RUPA).
240. See id. § 601 (listing withdrawal and expulsion of partner as two events of dissociation).
241. See UPA § 31, 6 U.L.A. at 376 (listing "events" of dissolution under UPA, including
express will and expulsion of partner).
242. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (stating definition of UPA "dissolution");
supra note 155 and accompanying text (describing usage and meaning of RUPA "dissociation").
243. See REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 701 (Proposed Official Draft 1992) (providing
mechanism by which remaining partners may buy departing partner's interest, if no dissolution
occurs under article eight); id. § 803 (stating that partnership continues after dissolution until
winding up is complete); supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text (describing two paths
under RUPA after dissociation).
244. See REVISED UNIT. PARTNERSIP ACT § 701 (Proposed Official Draft 1992) (providing
procedure for buyout of partner's interest if no dissolution under article eight).
245. See id. § 801 (listing events of RUPA dissolution).
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UPA, dissolution may or may not result in a termination of the partnership 246
and often does not. 247
Under the RUPA, the term "dissolution" indicates the definite beginning of the winding up process. 24 Section 801 of the RUPA lists withdrawal
of a partner in an at-will partnership as one of the "[e]vents Causing
Dissolution and Winding Up of Partnership Business." 2 9 However, pursuant
to section 802, the withdrawal of a partner in an at-will partnership does
not effect a dissolution-beginning of the windup-until ninety days have
passed, which allows partners who wish to continue the business an opportunity to buy out the departing partner's interest. 20 Thus, under the RUPA,
the termination or liquidation of the partnership may or may not occur
after an event of dissolution under section 801 (1) (withdrawal of a partner
in an at-will partnership) or 801(2)(i) (withdrawal of a partner after the
wrongful dissociation of another partner). For example, if a partner in an
at-will partnership expressly withdraws under section 801(1), section 802
delays the dissolution for ninety days, allowing partners wishing to continue
251
the business an opportunity to purchase the departing partner's interest.
The Drafting Committee decided to delay dissolution in order to avoid a
technical dissolution in the case of a negotiated buyout of a partner or
waiver by the departing partner of the liquidation right under section 801
of the RUPA.252 Thus, it is not always clear that an event of dissolution
under section 801 will effect a definite partnership winding up and termination.
The potential for confusion created by the terminology of the RUPA
breakup provisions seems astronomical given the similarity between UPA
"dissolution" and the RUPA "dissociation," the RUPA's new definition
of dissolution, and the RUPA's substitution of dissolution with dissociation
as the trigger for the breakup provisions. Further, the structure of the
RUPA is awkward in its seemingly desperate continuation of the term
"dissolution," and this is especially curious when one considers that a
seeming consensus existed among the drafters that the term causes confu-

246. See supra note 68 (giving examples of cases explaining that partners may continue
business after dissolution under valid partnership agreement).
247. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (asserting that most partnerships continue
after dissolution, regardless of existence of partnership agreement).
248. See supra note 162 and accompanying text (discussing RUPA's new use of dissolution).
249. See REviSED UN I. P, rTNmRsmp ACT § 801(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1992) (listing
withdrawal of partner in at-will partnership as event causing dissolution and winding up).
250. See id. § 802 (delaying dissolution of partnership after withdrawal of partner in atwill partnership); REviSED U i. PARTNiERsmP AcT
(noting that delay period slows down process of
purchase departing partner's interest).
251. See R-sED UNi. PARTNERsH p ACT §
(noting that delay period slows down process of
purchase departing partner's interest).
252. Id.

§ 802 cmt. (Proposed Official Draft 1991)
dissolution in order for partnerships to
802 cmt. (Proposed Official Draft 1991)
dissolution in order for partnerships to
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sion. 2 5 Why not just leave dissolution out of section 801 and indicate that
only those events of dissociation described in section 801 result in a definite
4
windup and termination?2
A brief, historical review of Drafting Committee action in writing the
RUPA sheds light on the "dissolution" dilemma.2"5 A split existed between
members of the Drafting Committee in that one group wished to maintain
the use of dissolution and another group did not. 6 The Drafting Committee
first completed drafts of the RUPA that did not contain the term dissolution. 5 7 Then, in the spring of 1990, the Drafting Committee decided to add
dissolution back into the statute without any revision of the structure of
the RUPA or change in the substantive decisions underlying the structure
of the RUPA. 2 1 Indeed, Dean Weidner deemed the continued use of
dissolution "surplusage." 9 Because the RUPA may not add clarity to the
law governing partnerships breakups, and may therefore not add stability,
surplusage actually may be the least of future problems involving the
26
"dissolution" dilemma. 0
B.

Hypothetical Situation Demonstrating PotentialProblemsfor
Withdrawing Partnerin an At-Will, Closely Held Partnership

For many reasons the small partnership is the best model for consideration and analysis of the RUPA.2' In fact, Dean Weidner and members
of the Drafting Committee believe that the model act is designed for the
small partnership. 262 Of primary importance is the fact that small partner-

253. See Weidner, supra note 9, at 435-38 (discussing confusion caused by UPA dissolution); supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text (discussing confusion caused by UPA term
"dissolution").
254. See discussion infra part V (offering suggestion to Drafting Committee to revise
RUPA without dissolution).
255. See Weidner, supra note 9, at 448-53 (discussing history of drafting, continued use
of dissolution in RUPA, and possible tax classification problem feared by some commentators
of RUPA).
- 256. See id. at 448 (noting split among Drafting Committee members over continued use
of dissolution).
257. See id. (noting that Drafting Committee first completed RUPA without using
"dissolution").
258. See id. (stating that Drafting Committee neither changed structure or substantive
decisions behind structure after "dissolution" was reinserted).
259. Id.
260. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (discussing Drafting Committee's
intent to add stability to partnerships by increasing clarity of provisions handling partnership
breakups).
261. See REVISED UNIF. PARTNERsHP ACT § 801 commentary at 116 (Proposed Official
Draft 1991) (stating that many members of Drafting Committee believe that default rules are
designed for small partnerships); Ribstein, supra note 12, at 364 (stating that small business
is suitable model for statutory dissociation provisions because large partnerships are more
likely to enter into customized agreements that control effects of dissociation).
262. See REVISED UNUF. PARTNERStap ACT § 801 commentary at 116 (Proposed Official
Draft 1991) (stating that many members of Drafting Committee believe that default rules of
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ships often do not execute written partnership agreements because of the
high transaction costs or the informal and optimistic environment surrounding the formation of a small partnership. 26" Also, partners in small businesses
may make an agreement that lacks specificity or coverage of breakup
issues. 2" On the other hand, large partnerships usually have elaborate
agreements covering almost all facets of the partnership business, including
partnership breakups.265 Therefore, because the Drafting Committee intends
most of the RUPA to act as default rules, 2 " the RUPA will have the
greatest effect on small partnerships.
A hypothetical situation involving a closely held partnership will help
to demonstrate the breakup scheme of the RUPA and some unforeseen,
adverse results to a withdrawing partner. Alvin, Jeeves, and Susan have
decided to work together ranching cattle in eastern Iowa. Susan supplied
two thirds of the initial capital and Jeeves secured a loan for the remaining
amount. The three partners agreed orally to equal shares of management
control. However, each of them brought a different expertise to the partnership. Alvin graduated from business school at a local university and
specialized in marketing. Jeeves acquired cattle expertise after spending
much of his young adult life on various ranches. Susan holds doctoral
degrees in microbiology and veterinarian medicine.
After three years of difficult and unprofitable operations, the atmosphere surrounding the partnership became tense. Susan then discovered that
a parasitic virus had been plaguing the cattle. Next, Susan researched the
possible adverse effects to humans. Susan was not sure, but she told Jeeves
that the virus might harm human consumers. Almost simultaneously, Alvin
potentially secured several large and expectedly profitable sales of the cattle.
The sales could occur immediately. Alvin convinced Jeeves that Susan's
research was speculative and that the partnership should continue business.

RUPA are designed for small partnerships); Weidner, supra note 11, at 847 (stating that
"partnership statute is for the small business people of America, for ranchers, farmers,
merchants, and small ihanufacturers").
263. See Ribstein, supra note 12, at 362 (stating that many partners when forming
partnership often underestimate benefits of breakup provisions in partnership agreement because
of optimistic attitudes at beginning of business).
264. See Longley Supply Co. v. Styron, 214 S.E.2d 777, 779 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975) (finding
that because partnership dissolution agreement failed to address resulting liability after dissolution, agreement was inapplicable and relevant UPA section applied, which stated that partners
were liable for losses in proportion to their share in profits); REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIp ACT
§ 801 commentary at 116 (Proposed Official Draft 1991) (stating that default rules-provisions
that apply only in absence of partnership agreement-are designed for small partnerships);
Ribstein, supra note 12, at 362 (noting that casual partnerships may not have partnership
agreements and may give no consideration to statutory rules governing partnerships).
265. See Ribstein, supra note 12, at 364 (stating that large partnerships usually have
customized partnership agreements).
266. See REVISED UNri. PARmNEsms, ACT § 103 (Proposed Official Draft 1992) (listing
limited number of RUPA provisions not subject to contrary agreement and rules that partnership agreement may not "unreasonably" vary); Weidner, supra note 9, at 454-56 (describing
how Drafting Committee minimized RUPA's mandatory rules).
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Susan then became convinced of her research and decided that such a sale
could result in widespread illness and death to many people. Susan decided
to pull out of the partnership before the sales were finalized in hopes of
lowering her exposure to liability. She also hoped to take her two-thirds of
the cattle and use them in a different venture. Susan consulted local attorney
"X" who is a self-professed "expert" on the new partnership law, the
RUPA, enacted by Iowa.

Susan discovered the following unfortunate results of her association
with Alvin and Jeeves. Attorney X told Susan that she is a member of a
legal partnership 67 and because the partnership never created a partnership
agreement, the partnership laws-RUPA-of the State of Iowa govern her

affairs by default. 26s First, Susan must wait for at least ninety days to
receive any share of the partnership assets. 269 Second, Susan has no control
or authority in partnership affairs for the ninety day period 270 and she may
be bound or liable to third parties by the acts of her former partners for

the same period. 271 Susan then realized that her former partners, now hostile
to her, hold and control her assets-a majority of which she contributed"hostage" for at least three months. 272 Third, Alvin and Jeeves may continue
the regular business of cattle ranching, including sales, as if nothing has
occurred. 273 Attorney X explained that the delay provisions are completely
new 274 and the previous partnership statute, the UPA, would have declared
an immediate dissolution of the partnership. 275 The UPA dissolution would
267. See REVISED UbnI. PARTNERSHnp ACT § 202(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1992) (continuing traditional rule of UPA that parties who carry on common business may form legal
partnership regardless of absence of written agreement); REVISED UmNF. PARTNERSnH ACT §
202(a) cmt. (Proposed Official Draft 1991) (stating that Drafting Committee intended language
of RUPA § 202(a) to codify traditional judicial construction of UPA § 6(1) that persons may
form partnership through common enterprise regardless of intent).
268. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing effect of default rule on
partnership without agreement to contrary).
269. See REVISED UNIF. PAgTgrNEas
ACT § 802(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1992) (delaying
withdrawal of partner in at-will partnership); supra notes 173-77 and accompanying text
(discussing effects of RUPA § 802).
270. See supra note 220 and accompanying text (discussing effects of RUPA § 802(c)(1)).
271. See supra note 224 and accompanying text (discussing potential liability of withdrawing partner pursuant to § 802(c)(2)).

272. See

BROMBERG
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RiBsTEiN,

supra note 8, § 7.01(d), at 7:9 (stating that without

dissolution at will partner may be "hostage" of hostile partnership and that fiduciary duties
may not satisfactorily protect interests of hostage partner); Elfin, supra note 97, at 663 (noting
that advantage of right to cause dissolution at will is protection against exploiting conduct by
managing partner or majority of partners).
273. See REVISED UNIm. PARTN-ERsnw ACT § 802(c)(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1992)
(extinguishing departing partner's authority to act for partnership during ninety day delay
period after withdrawal from at-will partnership).
274. See REVISED UNIF. PARTNERsiu' ACT § 802 cmt. (Proposed Official Draft 1991)
(stating that § 802 is new and effects compromise that preserves right of partner in at-will
partnership to dissolve partnership, but slows down prodeess of liquidation).
275. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text (discussing immediate effect of UPA
§ 33 to extinguish all authority of all partners to act on behalf of partnership except for
purposes of winding up business).
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have stopped an inconclusive cattle sale because all the partners would lose
authority to act for the partnership except for actions necessary to wrap up
the existing business affairs of the partnership. 2 6 Attorney X explained that
the former rules of the UPA, declaring a dissolution and extinguishing the
authority of partners, not only protected the withdrawing partner's capital
277
investment, but also increased the flexibility or liquidity of the investment.
These rules therefore increased an individual's ability to freely choose where
to invest potentially scarce monetary and human resources. 278
Next, Susan asked attorney X about her liability to the buyers of the
cattle and to those who might become ill from consuming the cattle.
Attorney X thought that Alvin and Jeeves might have to indemnify Susan
for any contractual liability to the cattle buyers. 2 9 Susan responded that
indemnification from Alvin and Jeeves is useless because they have nothing
with which to indemnify her and that she was the partner who contributed
the bulk of the capitalization. Attorney X told Susan that she has seen this
problem before, especially with failing partnerships that have no substantial
assets except those of the withdrawing partner. Attorney X told Susan that
she normally advises all new client partnerships, especially small partnerships, to draft around the default provisions that mandate a ninety day
delay.u 0 Attorney X related that it is typically those partners in small
businesses, not quite as sophisticated as others in large partnerships, that
find themselves at the mercy of the delay provisions.
Next, attorney X explained that because section 802(c) cuts off Susan's
right to participate in the business, Susan has no statutory power to stop
the remaining partner's from making any financial move.28 ' Furthermore,
attorney X related that she is sure that Susan cannot lower her contractual
liability during the ninety day delay period by filing a statement of
dissociation
or dissolution 283 because both take effect ninety days after

276. See UPA § 33, 6 U.L.A. at 423 (stating rule that all authority for partners ends
upon dissolution); supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text (discussing Daniels Trucking,

which involves case of extinguishment of partner's authority after UPA dissolution).
277. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (asserting that liquidity of partner's
investment in partnership is increased by easy dissolution of business).
278. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (stating that ease of dissolution of at-will
partnership serves to better protect partner's investment and personal human resources).
279. See REvisED Umr. PARTNRsmp ACT § 802(c)(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1992)
(stating that remaining partners must indemnify withdrawing partner for obligations not
appropriate for winding up business).
280. See id. § 802(a) (mandating ninety day delay for dissolution upon withdrawal of
partner in at-will partnership); supra note 12 (discussing unique nonretroactive treatment of §
802 by Drafting Committee that demonstrates awareness of potentially adverse effects § 802
may have upon partnerships).
281. See REVISED UNF. PARTNERsmp ACT § 802(c)(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1992)
(extinguishing withdrawing partner's right to management).
282. See id. § 704 (providing for filing of statement of dissociation in order to limit
possible liability under § 703(b)); supra notes 201-12 and accompanying text (discussing potential

liability of partner pursuant to § 703).
283. See REVISED UNr. PARTNERsap ACT § 806 (Proposed Official Draft 1992) (providing
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filing. 2 4 Attorney X also told Susan that Susan is still liable to any
unfortunate consumer of the cattle. 2 5 However, attorney X explained2 6 that
this rule of liability is the same as the previous one under the UPA. 1
Ever practical, Susan asked why her elected representatives would enact
such a statute. Attorney X responded that the original writers, of the RUPA
believed the former partnership statute destabilized partnerships because of
the statute's reliance on a conceptual-aggregate-theory of partnership.2

Therefore, the writers decided to emphasize another theory called the entity
theory of partnership. 28 The writers probably created the three month delay
period to encourage the sale of a departing partner's interest before the
liquidation of the partnership. 2

9

The delay period therefore furthers the

conceptual theory that the partnership is a separate legal entity. Attorney
X also explained that some legal commentators had proposed a practical

for filing of statement of dissolution in order to limit possible liability under § 803); supra
notes 213-18 and accompanying text (discussing potential liability of partner pursuant to §
803).
284. See REVISED UNIF. PARTNERsEap ACT §§ 704(b), 806(c) (Proposed Official Draft
1992) (stating that notice takes effect ninety days after filing).
285. See id. § 802(c)(2) (stating that withdrawing partner is still liable as to third parties).
286. See supra notes 219-26 and accompanying text (discussing continued liability under
§ 802(c)); supra notes 213-18 and accompanying text (discussing continued liability under §
803 and intent of Drafting Committee to retain general continuing liability rule of UPA).
287. See Weidner, supra note 9, at 436-38 (stating that aggregate theory of partnership
inherent in UPA destabilizes partnerships).
288. See REVISED UNII. PARTNERsHP ACT § 201 (Proposed Official Draft 1992) (defining
partnership as entity); REVISED UNiF. PARTNERSHip ACT § 201 cmt. (Proposed Official Draft
1991) (stating that RUPA makes net move towards entity theory of partnership); Weidner,
supra note 9, at 431-32 (discussing how breakup rules reflect entity theory of partnership).
Dean Weidner stated that the policy goals of the Drafting Committee were as follows:
(1) to move further towards an entity theory of partnership; (2) to increase the stability of
partnerships by revising the breakup provisions; and (3) to increase the importance of the
partnership agreement by lowering the number of mandatory rules in the RUPA. Id. at 428.
Because these policy decisions should drive and direct the various revisions to the UPA,
these policy goals should also undergo critical analysis. Dean Weidner stated that "the consensus
seems to be that a revised UPA should more directly adopt an entity model," id. at 429, and
that there is "virtual unanimity that RUPA should make a major move away from the
aggregate theory and closer to the entity theory." Weidner, supra note 11, at 858. Yet, Dean
Weidner only cites one scholar as support for both of these statements, Weidner, supra note
9, at 429 n.8, and one other commentator who is actually critical of conceptual emphasis in
structuring model reform. Weidner, supra note 11, at 858 n.56. See generally Rosin, supra
note 24 (advancing argument against strict conceptual approach to statutory reform). Furthermore, the Committee on Uniform State Laws of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York published a recent article concluding that the RUPA should not define a partnership
as an entity. Committee on Uniform State Laws, Entity Theory of Partnership, supra note
42, at 571. The Committee on Uniform State Laws favors a more flexible approach, using
judicial consideration of the interests of various parties involved, in determining whether an
entity or aggregate approach should be adopted in particular partnership problems. Id. at 570.
At best, the "virtually unanimous" consensus may not be so unanimous.
289. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (discussing how RUPA encourages buyouts
of withdrawing partner's interest in business).
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approach to creating a model partnership statute.m Attorney X rationalized
that such a flexible approach to partnership problems might have alleviated
the strict conceptual problem in which Susan finds herself.
Still confused, Susan asked why would the writers make a statute that
seems to penalize small partnerships, which are the businesses most likely

not to have the resources or inclination to create an agreement reflecting
the reality of their viewpoint: that the partnership is made up of unique

individuals and should break up if a partner leaves. 29' Attorney X shrugged
her shoulders and Susan's headache began.
V.

SucEsnoNs

Some relatively minor revisions to the RUPA may reduce confusion
and prevent some potential problems for partners in closely held partnerships.
I. Delete all references to partnership "dissolution. "' 292 The Drafting

Committee reinserted dissolution without any simultaneous amendment to
either the structure of the RUPA or the substantive decisions underlying an
29
earlier version of the RUPA that did not contain the term "dissolution. '
In light of this information and because dissolution as a legal term has
caused much past confusion, revising the RUPA without "dissolution"
makes enormous sense. The Drafting Committee could accomplish this
amendment by deleting the references to dissolution in article eight and by

indicating that only those events of "dissociation" listed in section 801 lead
to a definite winding up and termination.
II. Add an additional subsection to section 802 of the RUPA that
would limit the type of activity a partnership may conduct during the ninety
day negotiation period envisioned by the Drafting Committee. For example,

290. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (discussing functional approaches
suggested by several commentators to various partnership roblems).
291. See Ravyiss
Urw. PARTNER SHIP ACT § 801 commentary at 116 (Proposed Official
Draft 1991) (stating that partners, especially those in small businesses, probably think partnership will break up upon departure of any partner); Weidner, supra note 9, at 433 (stating
that aggregate theory is more suitable for small businesses and that small businesses design
agreements reflecting aggregate concept of partnership).
Notably, the ABA Ad Hoc Committee reviewing the RUPA strongly believes that a
partner in an at-will partnership should not have the right to liquidate the partnership. In this
way, no ninety day delay would be necessary at all and the withdrawing partner would only
have a buyout right under the RUPA. REViSED UNir. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 801 commentary at
116 (Proposed Official Draft 1991). However, one may appropriately inquire as to how the
members of the ABA Ad Hoc Committee view partnerships-in other words, through the eyes
of small or large partnerships.
292. See supra notes 255-60 and accompanying text (discussing background of "dissolution" amendments).
293. See Weidner, supra note 9, at 448 (stating that Drafting Committee made no
simultaneous amendment to either structure or underlying decisions of structure after the
Drafting Committee reinserted "dissolution"). Unfortunately, Dean Weidner did not explain
exactly which "substantive" decisions were "hung" on the structure of the RUPA version
that did not contain dissolution. Id.
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restrain the remaining partners from "substantially" depleting the partnership assets or potentially risking the entire capital base of the partnership.
The RUPA could list general criteria by which a court could restrict the
remaining partners. Such a flexible approach might better protect withdrawing partners in closely held, at-will partnerships. To further protect withdrawing partners, the RUPA could expressly grant court authority to issue
an injunction against such partnership activity during the delay period.
VI. CONCLUSION
The RUPA completely revises the basis of almost eight decades of
partnership law in the United States. Because the RUPA breakup provisions
use old terminology in an entirely new fashion and add new terms to the
primary lexicon of partnership law, the RUPA breakup provisions will
almost assuredly cause greater confusion in the partnership business community and the legal profession. Furthermore, the RUPA's shift to the
entity theory of partnership, reflected in the breakup provisions, will have
potentially unforeseen, adverse effects on small partnerships. In order to
avoid these problems, the Drafting Committee might reconsider those provisions that potentially condemn the RUPA to become the Revised Revised
Uniform Partnership Act.
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